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Abstract 
 
This thesis following the post-1999 Greek-Turkish rapprochement takes as a starting 
point the expansion of economic exchanges between the two states and seeks to 
explore possible linkages between economic and political relations. This expansion of 
economic relations led to the creation of hopes in the political and business elites that 
economic cooperation can have a potent normalizing effect on contentious issues that 
for decades have divided the two countries. This thesis -through an evaluation of the 
two states trade, Foreign Direct Investment, tourism and energy cooperation- argues 
that; there are economic limitations in these fields that should first taken under 
consideration before one move on to the political problems; and further that it is 
unlikely for economic cooperation by itself to lend long-held political positions and 
relations vulnerable to economic interests, especially in the more sensitive issues like 
the Aegean disputes.  
 
Keywords: Greece, Turkey, economic cooperation, bilateral political relations.  
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Özet 
 
Bu tez, 1999 Türk-Yunan yakınlaşması sonrası dönemi iki devlet arasındaki ekonomik 
ilişkilerin gelişmesinin başlangıç noktası alarak iki ülkenin siyasi ve ekonomik 
ilişkileri arasındaki bağlantıları araştırmayı hedeflemektedir. 1999 sonrası ekonomik 
ilişkilerin gelişmesi, siyaset ve iş dünyası ileri gelenlerinin iki ülkenin arasında 
yıllardır var olan sorunların güçlü bir normalleştirme sürecine gireceği umuduna 
kapılmalarına yol açmıştır. Bu tez; iki ülke arasındaki ticari ilişkiler, doğrudan 
yabancı yatırım ve turizm ve enerji alanındaki işbirliklerini inceleyerek bu konuların 
siyasi problemler üzerinde yaratabileceği pozitif etkiyi düşünmeden önce, bu 
konulardaki ekonomik kısıtlamaların göz önüne alınması gerektiğine işaret 
etmektedir. Bu bağlamda, ekonomik ilişkilerin, Ege‟deki özellikle ekonomik kaygılar 
taşıyan sorunlar da dâhil olmak üzere uzun zamandır süregelen siyasi meselelerin 
çözümü için yeterli olmayacağını savunmaktadır. 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Yunanistan, Türkiye, ekonomik işbirliği, ikili siyasi ilişkiler. 
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Introduction 
 
Greece and Turkey have faced the threat of armed confrontation several times in their 
history, and the main reasons were the bilateral problems and the Cyprus question.
1
 It 
is an unfortunate truth that nationalism- as a powerful political force- frequently 
caused tensions to the bilateral relations of the two states.
2
   
 After 1999, however, the relations of Greece and Turkey change significantly. 
It was after the devastating earthquakes in Greece and Turkey -which accelerated the 
diplomatic relations as well as the informal ties between the civil societies of both 
sides-
3
 and the Helsinki Summit where Turkey was accepted as candidate state that a 
new rapprochement was initiated and underpinned mainly by Turkish Foreign 
Minister (FM) Ismail Cem and his counterpart George Papandreou.
4
 The two 
ministers realized that a new approach was needed in order to formulate a policy that 
would bring the two countries closer, by cooperation and mutual understanding on 
matters out of the sphere of constant disagreement and potential conflict between 
them, such as the Aegean or Cyprus, and tried to built this new relationship on the 
basis of cooperation on what is called low political significance, on matters of 
                                                 
1
 The Cyprus issue is left out of the scope of this paper as it is an issue that stands at the centre of 
multiple transformative effects both in the domestic and foreign policy paradigm of both Greece and 
Turkey. D. Tsarouhas, op. cit., p. 50. For relevant readings on Cyprus, see Andreas Theophanous, 
„Prospects for Solving the Cyprus Problem and the Role of the European Union‟, Publius, vol. 30, no. 
1–2, Winter–Spring 2000, pp. 217–241; Tozun Bahcheli, „Searching for a Cyprus Settlement: Consid-
ering Options for Creating a Federation, a Confederation, or Two Independent States‟, Publius, vol. 30, 
no. 1–2, Winter–Spring 2000, pp. 203–216; Thomas Diez, ed., The European Union and the Cyprus 
Conflict: Modern Conflict Postmodern Union (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002).  S. 
Akgonul, “Reciprocity: Greek and Turkish Minorities, Law, religion, and Politics” (Istanbul: Istanbul 
Bilgi University, 2008) 
2
 G. Bertrand, “Greek-Turkish relations from the Cold War to rapprochement”, Observatory of 
European Foreign Policy, EUTR 5/2003, pp. 1-3 
3
  Z. Onis, Greek-Turkish relations and the European Union: a critical perspective, revised draft, (April 
2001), pp. 3-10 
4
 A. O. Evin, “The Future of Greek-Turkish Relations”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 
Vol. 5, No. 3, 2003, pp. 397-398 
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tourism, trade, environment and others.
5
 It was in this context that bilateral economic 
relations developed between the two countries and a network of civil society and 
economic actors was formed.       
 This expansion of economic cooperation between Greece and Turkey has 
aroused the attention of scholars how have seek to examine if economic partnership -
in accord with interdependence theory- might be able to have a potent normalizing 
effect of their own on the political realities of the two states.
6
    
 This thesis will try to build on these researches and analyze the possible 
linkages between economic and political relations by looking the Greek-Turkish 
relations under the prism of economic cooperation. More specifically, it is going to be 
explored if economic cooperation can have positive spillover effects in the political 
realities of Greece and Turkey. Thus, it will be researched if stronger (flourishing) 
economic relations between the two states can possibly have a positive effect on their 
bilateral relations and problems
7
-as they may create the necessary conditions for a 
bigger and stronger variety of opinions (developed and expressed mainly by the 
business communities) and therefore make harder the deterioration of relations. In 
order to analyze this we will examine the bilateral economic relations since the 
rapprochement following 1999 until 2010, where Greece started experiencing one of 
                                                 
5
 J. Ker – Lindsay, “Crisis and reconciliation: a year of rapprochement between Greece and Turkey”, 
(I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd Publications, 2007), p. 51  
6
 Many papers that try to analyze Greek and Turkish economic relations and their role on the political 
relations have been written some of them- which we will also going to mention and frequently cite later 
on- are: D. Tsarouhas, “The political economy of Greek-Turkish relations”, Southeast European and 
Black Sea Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 39-57, C. A. Papadopoulos, “Greek-Turkish Economic 
Cooperation: Guarantor of Détente or Hostage to Politics?” South East European Studies at Oxford, 
Occasional Paper No. 8/08, March 2008, M. Kutlay, “A political Economy Approach to the expansion 
of Turkish-Greek relations: Interdependence or Not?” Perceptions, Spring-Summer 2009.  
7
 When we referrer to their bilateral relations and realities the thesis is mainly referring to the in the 
more sensitive issues like the Aegean disputes –which are the territorial water; the demilitarised status 
of the Eastern Aegean Islands; sovereignty over certain islands, islets and rocks; the extent of Greek air 
space; and Air traffic services and Command and control within NATO that remain unresolved until 
today. For further bibliography on the disputed issues look at: A. Hraklidis, Greece and the east 
danger, (Athens: Polis, 2001), I Balinakis, Introduction to Greek Foreign Policy, (Athens: Paratiritis), 
M. Aydņ, K. Ifantis, Turkish-Greek relations: the security dilemma in the Aegean, (Portland, OR: 
Frank Cass, 2004). 
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the worst economic crises in its history. Although the Greek economic crisis will be 
taken under consideration in this thesis, it is not going to be further analyzed as it is 
still an evolving process. As far as the economic areas -that are going to be analyzed 
and examined- is concerned these are; trade, foreign direct investment, energy and 
tourism. In the framework of economic cooperation many researchers have focused 
on the field of armament as well. Armament, is a sector of great importance in the 
Greek-Turkish case, especially if one takes under consideration the continuous arms 
race between the two states for many years (specifically in the 1990s when arm race 
expenditures were risen
8
). Although, armament is a crucial sector of cooperation in 
the bilateral relations it is beyond the scope of this thesis on the grounds that the focus 
of this thesis is going to be limited n most obvious economic fields -like trade, 
investments, tourism and energy- that can also be clear indicators of economic 
cooperation.          
 In order to examine the above research question primary sources and data, like 
bilateral agreements signed by the two countries in the areas of tourism, energy, 
taxation, trade, and other, statistical data about their economic interaction from the 
national statistical services of both countries, ministries and consulates official 
economic reports, statements by state officials, and also secondary sources, like 
scientific articles, edited books and articles of international and national press, are 
going to be analyzed.  
  The thesis is organized in the following way; the first chapter gives a 
perspective around the main discussions (like the role of the state and economics, the 
                                                 
8
 E. Evaghorou, “The Economics of Defence of Greece and Turkey: A Contemporary Theoretical 
Approach for States Rivalry and Arms Race”, Center for International Politics Thessaloniki. Retrieved 
June 25, 2011. http://files.mgkworld.net/cipt/docs/CIPTEvaghorouDefEcoGRTR.pdf . For more 
information on the armaments see: G. Georgiou, P. Kapopoulos, S. Lazaretou, “Modeling Greek-
Turkish Rivalry: An Empirical Investigation of Defence Spending Dynamics” in Journal of Peace 
Research, 33:2, (May 1996). 
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relations between states) and theories of International Political Economy. In what 
follows we elaborate on the evolution of the Greek and Turkish economies towards a 
market oriented, liberalized system and their bilateral economic ties in order to see 
what led to today‟s realties. Following, the bilateral economic relations with a special 
emphasis on the commercial relations, investments, and energy agreements are 
examined, while at the end an effort is made to link our theoretical framework with 
the Greek-Turkish case. Also, in this framework a small analysis concerning the role 
that economic association‟s, institutions, NGO‟s play in Greek-Turkish cooperation is 
going to be provided. It should be noted, however, that although these economic 
associations and institutions could be important parts of the analysis an overall 
observation shows that these associations are far below the role they could play within 
the framework of Greek-Turkish political economic relations. In the concluding 
chapter, problems identified following our analysis -like limitations in the economic 
field, that may affect future development and hence the power and influence of 
business groups, and the possible limitation that economic interdependence can have 
as a normalizing tool in the bilateral relations- is going to be discussed.   
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Chapter 1 
International Political Economy 
 
1.1 The theoretical base  
International Political Economy (IPE), from the very beginning of its creation as an 
independent academic field in the 1970s
9
, has constantly tried to close the gap 
between economics and politics. The political actions and choices of nation-states 
affect international trade, finance and monetary flows which of course affect the 
environment in which states take political decisions and entrepreneurs make economic 
choices.
10
 It is these crucial interactions of the market and the state, which both 
economists and political scientists fail to capture, that created IPE. To use R. Gilpin‟s 
words “the parallel existence and mutual interaction of “state” and “market” in the 
modern world create “political economy”; without both state and market there could 
be no political economy”. 11         
 The definition, therefore, that could be used for the study of IPE is the one 
provided by S. Strange that states that “IPE concerns the social, political and 
economic arrangements affecting the global systems of production, exchange and 
distribution, and the mix of values reflected therein. Those arrangements are not 
divinely ordained, nor are they the fortuitous outcome of blind change. Rather they 
are the result of human decisions taken in the context of man-made institutions and 
sets of self rules and customs.”12 
                                                 
9
 The breakdown of the Bretton Woods monetary system and the oil embargoes of the 1970s are 
frequently cited as key events that made clear how much the two fields were intertwined. 
10
 M. Veseth, “What is International Political economy”. Retrieved Jan. 10, 2011. 
http://www.pugetsound.edu/academics/departments-and-programs/undergraduate/ipe/what-is-ipe/ 
11
 R. Gilpin, The political economy of International relations, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1987),  p.8 
12
 S. Strange, States and Markets, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), p. 18 
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 As the world changes and new developments occurred in the world of political 
economy, new and different schools of thought that try to explain the interaction of 
economics and politics have developed in IPE. Although there are many theories that 
try to explain the relationship of economics and politics attention is going to be given 
on the most influential of these theories; economic nationalism, Marxism and 
economic Liberalism. Its true that, though scholars have produced a number of 
theories in an effort to understand and explain the relationship between economics 
and politics, these three theories stand out as they have not only had a profound 
influence on scholarship but also to political affairs.
13
 Today, contemporary theories 
focusing on the function of IPE have been developed. Nonetheless, most of them have 
derived principally or have been strongly influenced form economic nationalism, 
liberalism or Marxism.
14
 And that is why the focus of this thesis will be given to these 
three most influential theories.       
  Through an evaluation of the main positions, strengths and weakens and thus 
discussions of these theories an effort will be given in order to set the framework 
where IPE could be better understood. These theories vary on a wide range of issues 
such as their conception of the role of the state, the role of economics and the 
relationships among society, states, and market.
15
     
 Therefore, our discussion and evaluation of these theories will start with 
economic nationalism and Marxism not only because these theories have developed as 
a reaction to liberal economics
16
 but also because it is this context of liberalism that 
the theory of interdependence -in which we are going to base our theoretical 
understanding about the Greek-Turkish relations - is going to be analyzed. As it going 
                                                 
13
 R. Gilpin, op. cit., pp. 26-66 
14
 Ibid.  
15
 S. Strange, op. cit, p.18 
16
 Ibid.  
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to be noticed, in contradiction with liberalists who believe that interdependence 
among national economies tend to foster pacific relations, economic nationalists like 
Marxists see interdependence as an asymmetrical situation that is identified as a 
source of conflict and insecurity.
17
 By analyzing the theoretical framework it going to 
be easier to research and explain the Greek-Turkish case.   
  
Economic nationalism  
The central idea of Economic nationalism is that economic activities are and should 
subordinate to the interest of the state. Economic nationalism except form advocating 
the primacy of politics over economics it also supports the idea of “protecting 
domestic consumption, labour and capital formation, even if this requires the 
imposition of tariffs and other restrictions on the movement of labour, goods and 
capital”.  For economic nationalists the state is not only the main actor in international 
relations (IR) but also the “instrument”18 of economic development. Furthermore for 
nationalism the security of the state is a prerequisite for the well being of its economy 
and policy. As far as the market is concerned, economic nationalism acknowledge the 
fact that markets must and should function in a world of “competitive groups and 
states”.19Nationalist recognize the fact that it is a cyclical relation and that as political 
relations among groups and states affect the operation of the markets, the market 
affects political relations. To summarize economic nationalism could be characterized 
by the following assertions: “a nation‟s citizenry largely shares (or should share) a 
common economic fate; the state has a crucial positive role in guiding the national 
economy to better performance; and the imperatives of nationalism should guide the 
                                                 
17
 Ibid  
18
 R. Gilpin, op. cit.,  p. 46 
19
 Ibid. 
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state‟s economic policies”.20        
 The main objective of economic nationalism is industrialization as it is thought 
to have a spill-over effect in the economy which of course leads to its overall 
modernization and development. Most importantly industrialization is associated with 
economic self-sufficiency, political autonomy and finally military power and national 
security.
21
And that is why industrialization is extremely prized, in opposition to 
interdependence, according to the nationalist school of thought. For economic 
nationalists trade and generally economic cooperation is one more area of 
international competition, as the economic interdependence raises the vulnerability of 
the states- especially weak states- to external economic and political forces.
22
 
Therefore, in a competitive world self-sufficiency and relative gains are considered to 
be extremely important for nationalists. Of course, economic nationalism tends to 
have some weakness as a theory of IPE, such as its tendency to:   
 Consider international economic relations as zero-sum game.23 Trade, 
investments and in general all economic interactions are seen primarily in a 
conflictual way. It‟s true that markets are able to bring mutual gains. As Gilpin 
rightfully states “the possibility of mutual benefit is the basis of the 
international market economy”.24  
 In addition, although nationalist do have a point when they support that the 
state must have an important role in economic development the state –centric 
                                                 
20
 D. Levi-Faur, “Economic nationalism: from Friedrich List to Robert Reich”, Review of International 
Studies, (1997), 23, 359–370. Retrieved Jan. 10-2011. 
http://mfaishalaminuddin.lecture.ub.ac.id/files/2009/11/listreich.pdf    
21
 Ibid 
22
C. M. Harlen, “A Reappraisal of Classical Economic Nationalism and Economic Liberalism”, 
International Studies Quarterly (1999) 43, pp. 733–744 
23
 That is one states gain is another‟s loss. 
24
 R. Gilpin, op. cit. 
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beliefs that they have followed is not in line with the developments of the 
world political economy.  
 Also nationalism tends to neglect the role of society in the making of policy, 
as it considers society and state as one. And thus forgets that society, as 
liberals claim, is consisted by individuals and groups that have there own 
agendas and there own political and economic interests.  
 
That is why alternative approaches that include other societal actors into the state-
market interaction, developed. However, these days- as well in the interwar period- 
due to the world economic crises economic nationalism has been enjoying great 
attention form both its opponents and its proponents.  
 
Marxism 
Marxism is an economic and social system set forth by the political and economic 
theories of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Marxism is mainly an economic and 
socio-political view for how to change the society by implementing socialism. 
Marxism introduced itself in mid 19
th
 century as a reaction against liberalism and 
classical economics. The main standpoint of Marxism is that economics drives 
politics. Social change and political conflict –according to Marxism- occurs because 
of the struggle between different classes within society over the distribution of wealth. 
This battle lead to the conclusion that capitalism, leads to the oppression of the 
proletariat (the poorer majority), and thus in order for political conflict to cease the 
market and the society of classes must be eliminated.
25
     
 The main characteristic of Marxism is the general view and understanding of 
                                                 
25
 See the full text of “The Communist Manifesto” English edition of 1888 from the Marxists Internet 
Archive. Retrieved Jan. 10, 2011.  http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-
manifesto/index.htm  
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capitalism and capitalist development along with the normative commitment to 
socialism. Moreover, Marxism is based upon a materialistic approach to history; the 
battle between classes over distribution and means of production is central to the 
change of history. Further, Marxists support that there is no inherent social harmony 
or return to social equilibrium and that is why the nature of reality is “dynamic” and 
“conflictual”.26 Therefore, for Marxism- as well as economic nationalism- economic 
relations are indeed conflictual.         
 As far as capitalism is concerned Marxism believes that the former is driven 
by wealthy capitalists who seek profits and capital accumulation by exploiting the 
other classes. Marxism argues that the structural contradictions within capitalism will 
eventually lead to its demise and its replacement by socialism. The belief was that 
capitalism would inevitably produce internal tensions which would lead to its 
destruction. And that is because there is an inherent contradiction in capitalism. A 
competitive market needs capitalists to save, invest and accumulate. However, 
accumulation of capital leads to overproduction of goods, this “disproportionality” 
between production and consumption decreases the incentive to invest and this causes 
economic depressions which lead to the uprising of the proletariat to overthrow the 
system.
27
           
 In the beginnings of the 20
th
 century the strengthening of nationalism, the 
continuation of capitalism and the advent of imperialism lead to the transformation of 
Marxism through the work of Lenin. Lenin argued that capitalism escaped its demise 
through overseas imperialism. Colonies had enabled capitalist economies to exploit 
them; capitalist economies had to expand in order to escape economic stagnation and 
internal revolution. Nonetheless, Lenin argued that because capitalist economies grow 
                                                 
26
 R. Gilpin, op. cit., p. 35 
27
 R. Gilpin, op. cit., pp.35-37 
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unevenly a capitalist system can never be stable for a long time. This “uneven” 
economic growth of power among states and the conflict for division of territory will 
cause the demise of imperial powers. As Gilpin puts it “Lenin believed that the 
inherent contradiction of capitalism resided in the consequent struggle of nations 
rather than in the class struggle”.28 Therefore in summary, Lenin argued that political 
competition among rising and demising capitalist powers leads to economic conflicts, 
rivalries and at the end war.        
 Another Marxist criticism of market/capital society is that it has the tendency 
to pursue aggressive foreign policies.
29
Marxists as well as economic nationalists, 
claim that interdependence is a source of conflict and insecurity. Interdependence 
according to Marxism creates dependency relations among states and as 
interdependence is never symmetrical, trade becomes a source that increases the 
political power of the strong over the weak. And that is why both -Marxists and 
economic nationalists- advocate policies of economic autarky. In every case, it is hard 
to believe, that protectionism (and all the more autarky) will not most probably make 
things worse than cooperation.
30
 On the other hand, it is seems to be true that there is 
a fine line between cooperation and competition and at that matter between 
competition and antagonism.
31
 Hence, it will be a very interesting case-study to see, 
where Greek-Turkish economic relations lead us in accordance with our theoretical 
standpoint of economic interdependence as a beneficial source of cooperation on more 
sensitive issues.          
 However Marxism has also limitations as a theory of world economy. The 
main limitation of Marxism as a theory is its weakness to appreciate the role of 
                                                 
28
 R. Gilpin, op.cit., pp. 39-42 
29
 R. Gilpin, op. cit., p. 53 
30
 C. Papadopoulos, op. cit., p. 4-7 
31
 Ibid.  
The political economy of Greek-Turkish Relations                                                                               12 
  
political and strategic factors in International relations.
32
 As it is seen Marxism 
perceives that economics drive politics, as capitalist societies impose policy through 
their governments, due to the fact that capitalist economies need to export goods and 
surplus capital. Thus the dynamic of international relations is driven by this need. 
However, the above does not prove that competition for markets is the only 
explanation for conflicts and wars between states. If one, for example, witness the 
Greek-Turkish example it will see that they are conflicts/disputes that have mainly to 
do with issues centred on topics of political, security and sovereignty rights
33
 and not 
with the nature of domestic economics.   
      
Liberalism 
Liberalism developed in the Enlightenment and can be seen as a response to the wide-
ranging state policies that tended to shape economic activity for state purposes. 
According to liberalism politics and economics exist in separate spheres. Liberals tend 
to oppose government intervention in the markets and argue that the latter should be 
free from political interference. Liberal theory advocates minimal interference of 
government in a market economy and free markets. This theory maintained that 
individual consumers (people, firms, enterprises, households) should be left alone in a 
self-regulated market by their self-interests activities. It is thought that individual 
interests are guided by natural economic laws that are far more beneficial and 
constructive for the society‟s/individuals welfare than the state economic activities.34 
Liberalism claims that the primary objective of an economic activity is to benefit 
individual consumers as the individual consumer is the basis of the society. 
                                                 
32
 R. Gilpin, op. cit., p. 56 
33
 C. Papadopoulos, op. cit., p. 34 
34
D. Henderson, “The Changing Fortunes of Economic Liberalism; Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow”, 
The Institute of Public Affairs, New Zealand Business Roundtable, February 1999, pp. 3-9 
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Liberalism could be defined according to Gilpin “as a doctrine and a set of principles 
for organizing and managing a market economy in order to achieve maximum 
efficiency, economic growth, and individual welfare”. 35   
 However, at the same time, the liberal theory reserves an important place for 
the state, in economic as well as political life. More generally, to use David 
Henderson‟s words “the liberal blueprint assigns to governments an indispensable 
strategic role in establishing and maintaining a framework in which markets can 
function effectively, in particular through the definition and enforcement of property 
rights, and in making possible the provision of goods and services, such as national 
defence, which are collectively rather than individually consumed”.36
 Furthermore, liberals tend to believe- in contrast to economic nationalists and 
Marxists- that interdependence and mutual economic benefits are the source for 
peaceful relations between nations. Market competition is not an area of conflict, they 
argued, but rather an area of peaceful cooperation. Liberal theoreticians explained that 
trade among nations, could be mutually beneficial, as all men would gain through 
participation in a global division of labour.
37
 As liberals perceive it, economics in 
contrast to politics unite people. According to liberals trade and economic 
interdependence create ties of mutual interest and a vested interest in international 
peace. Economics are seen as the ultimate science that explains the relations of states 
and societies and that is according to Gilpin one of the main weaknesses of 
Liberalism. Gilpin in his book “The political economy of International relations” 
identifies four great limitations of liberalism; 
                                                 
35
 R. Gilpin, op. cit., p. 27 
36
 D. Henderson, op. cit.   
37
 Richard M. Ebeling, “A new World Order: Economic Liberalism or the New Mercantilism”, The 
Future of Freedom Foundation, July 1991. Retrieved Jan. 10, 2011. 
http://www.fff.org/freedom/0791b.asp  
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 The first weakness of liberalism is that economics “artificially” separates the 
economy from other factors of society and takes as a given the existing social 
political and cultural framework. 
 Another limitation of this theory is its tendency to “disregard the justice or 
equity of the outcome of economic activities”. What Gilpin actually suggests 
is that the Marxist criticism on liberal economy was right to the point that 
liberal economies do act as a tool kit for managing a capitalist/market 
economy. 
 The main limitation however is the assumption that exchange is always free 
and has mutual gains if the two parts are equals how posses full information. 
However, the terms of an exchange can be highly affected by political, non-
economic factors like, differences in bargaining power/ negotiation clout, 
asymmetrical information, coercion, political influence and power and 
interests, and so one and so forth. These elements -as the nationalist‟s stress- 
can be of a huge importance in the organization of economic relations. These 
attributes can be significant factors determining how the gains from free trade 
will actually be distributed- in favor of the countries that posses them and to 
the loss of those that don‟t.38 It seems that Gilpin point is that by leaving out 
the effects that noneconomic factors can have on the exchange and further the 
effects of the exchange itself in politics, liberalism lacks a “true political 
economy”.39  
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However, despite its limitations Western society has been affected by liberalism and 
through the releasing of the market mechanism from political and social ties the West 
has reached a level of “unprecedented affluence”.40  
After the end of the Cold War and over the last 20 years the world has 
changed once more dramatically. It is true that the Cold War provided the framework 
in which the world economy operated. Nonetheless, the rise of “globalization” has 
brought real changes in the world politics and economics. Economic globalization 
more particular has introduced important developments in trade, finance, and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) by multinational corporations.
41
 Thus, as one can imagine 
globalization has change a lot the subject of IPE. Today with the expansion of world 
trade and the gradual impact of international finance in global economy national 
economies are much more linked closely to one another as international economic 
cooperation advances.
42
 Of course all these have lead to the emergence of new types 
of relations between states and to the “parallel growth in interdependencies between 
actors” (political, economic, or social).43 In today‟s world a new way has been opened 
to new diplomacy, economic and non-state actors. These new actors according to the 
interdependency theory have the power and the opportunity to put forward policy 
recommendations.
44
  
The interdependence theory- outlined in its most comprehensive way by 
Keohane and Nye- is of direct relevance to non-state actors. According to Nye and 
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Keohane, the fathers of the interdependence theory, it is not possible anymore to 
understand the world politics just by taken under consideration the interstate relations 
as realists suggest.
45
The theoreticians of interdependence in contrast to the realist 
school of thought diminish; the role of the military power; reject the hierarchy among 
issues (that is the absence of the realist dichotomy between high politics versus low 
politics issues) and thus the distinction between domestic and foreign issues becomes 
blurred; and finally introduce multiple channels of communication where the state is 
not the only unit and other types of relations do exist.
46
 This is what Keohane and Nye 
introduced as the concept of „complex interdependence‟47 whereby growing economic 
and social interdependence and cooperation among states -instead of conflict- is 
stressed.          
 What actually the two theoreticians suggest is that when complex 
interdependence prevails due to intensifying economic relations the importance of 
non-state actors- like multinational banks or corporations- in policy making is 
increased. As Keohane and Nye argue, corporations, banks, trade unions make 
decisions that transcend national boundaries and thus domestic policies of different 
countries impinge on one another more and more.
48
 Thus, due to that and to 
transnational communications the lines between domestic and foreign policy are 
blurred and the state is not the single unit organizing policy.
49
 And finally due to 
intense relations of mutual influence the likelihood of the use of military force is 
reduced, as its effects can be both costly and uncertain. Consequently, 
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interdependence seems to lead to more political cooperation and the use of force is 
either irrelevant or unimportant as instrument of policy.
50
     
 As it is noticed form the above the idea of cooperation –mainly economic- has 
seized a privileged position in the social sciences. According to the liberals economic 
cooperation is generally to be desired and encouraged as it perceived to foster pacific 
relations as it can act as a virtual substitute to military conflict. According to Keohane 
and Nye there are examples of countries where conflict does appear almost 
inconceivable. For example, Keohane and Nye in the book “Power and 
Interdependence” identify as the most indicative example of complex interdependence 
the case of USA and Canada. In general, Canadian-American relations seem to fit the 
three conditions of complex interdependence set by the two theoreticians. Military 
force plays only a minor role in their relationship, their relations are also notable for 
the multiple channels of contact, and finally the agenda of American-Canadian 
relations demonstrates a variety of issues “without a preponderance or domination of 
military security concerns” while at the same time a hierarchy among issues was hard 
to be established.
51
         
 According to scholars who have elaborate on the effects of economic 
cooperation and the role of interdependence another example that a resort to force 
seems unthinkable due to interdependence is the case of the European Union.
52
 
Although, Europe was an area of military conflict and war after WWII the European 
states started seeking out ways to reconstruct the continent and create a peaceful and 
prosperous post-war Europe. The way to achieve the above was based on the notion of 
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pooling resources for the common good, in the event in the coal and steal industries
53
 
and other economic fields as well.  Today, according to academicians, the EU 
member states seem to have banished the likelihood of force as a means of conflict 
resolution as they are highly interdependent not only economically but also socially 
and politically.
54
 Multiple channels of communications are open and functioning 
between all the member states, a wide range of issues without domination of military 
security concerns exists while at the same time a hierarchy among issues is hard to be 
established as the EU members have -through the creation of multilateral trans-
societal, institutional, and also market transaction based relations- forge common 
policies and projects.
55
 In this context France, Britain and Germany no longer feel 
threatened by each other as force is irrelevant or unimportant as an instrument of 
policy.
56
 Actually, the Franco-German paradigm is considered to be one of the most 
successful examples of cooperation relatively with the EU.
57
  
However, this pacific view of trade and cooperation raises some critical 
questions like; What if, the two countries bilateral trade is not in balance? What if the 
imbalance keeps growing? Will this not exacerbate underlying tensions?
58
 Therefore, 
does cooperation brings competition and thus antagonism or further cooperation and 
peaceful relations among states (especially in a realist-anarchic world where states 
seek to maximize power)? For economic nationalists and Marxists, bilateral 
interdependence seldom means mutual dependence, which lead to asymmetries in the 
relations and thus trade becomes a source of power of the strong over the weak. 
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 This argument seems to be supported by the theoreticians of complex 
interdependence who also agree that “the politics of economic interdependence 
involve competition even when large net benefits can be expected from cooperation”59 
further the two writers hold that interdependences should be perceived a situation of 
asymmetries in dependence that is likely to provide source of power over an issue to 
the less dependent actor.
60
  This conclusion made by the two writes seems to 
contradict their main argument that claims that under the conditions of complex 
interdependence the world politics is very different than under the realist conditions. 
And that increasing integration among states circumscribes their ability to develop 
totally independent courses in related policy areas, causing the cost-benefit analysis 
relating to the peace-conflict choice to be become more complicated for those think of 
the latter option.
61
 Nonetheless, although the two writers seem to contradict 
themselves about the role of cooperation and interdependence for the sake of this 
research it is going to be taken under consideration their main argument and 
framework about cooperation.         
 
Conclusions 
As it is seen from the analysis of the theories of IPE scholars differ on the nature of 
the relationship between economic and politics. In oversimplified terms, economic 
nationalism assumes and supports the primacy of politics over economics and 
advocates that economic interdependence is indeed conflictual. Marxism on the other 
hand holds that economics drive politics. Political conflicts arise from the struggle 
among classes over the distribution of wealth. Therefore, for Marxism as well 
economic relations are conflictual. However, they are conflictual not only on societal 
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level but also on international level as cooperation and interdependence are perceived 
as a cause of conflict and insecurity. For liberalism on the other hand economics are 
very important as they are seen as a source of cooperation and pacific relations in 
contrast to politics that is perceived as a source of conflict. For Liberals 
interdependence is a way to better understand and characterize world politics. 
Keohane and Nye perceived that interdependence will increasingly characterize world 
politics as each of the three conditions –lack of hierarchy among issues, presence of 
multiple channels of contact between societies and the absence of force- of complex 
interdependence better portray reality. Thus, what is going to be explored in the 
chapters that follow is if interdependence theory is a better explanatory model to 
apply to the Greek-Turkish situation. Because as the fathers of complex 
interdependence, Keohane and Nye, support in their book “sometimes realist 
assumption will be accurate or frequently accurate…Before one decides what 
explanatory model to apply to a situation or a problem, one will need to understand 
the degree to which realist or complex interdependence assumptions correspond to the 
situation…Most situations will fall somewhere between these two extremes.”62
 After having examined the main schools of thought of IPE and their ideas of 
the conflict between politics and economics, we will move on with empirical facts 
that will help us explore our theoretical understanding of interdependence. In the 
chapter that follows- in order to better understand Greek-Turkish economic relations 
and cooperation- the Greek and Turkish political economy after the 1980s when their 
economic liberalization and enter into market-oriented system started, is going to be 
explored.   
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Chapter 2 
Greek and Turkish political economy and their economic cooperation 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The quest for economic development and stability has been a defining factor for 
Greece and Turkey in the 20
th
 century. It is true that in the twentieth century both -
Greece‟s and Turkish- economies have walked a difficult and long road with a lot of 
ups and downs. Coming out of a tradition of a state-directed economy that was 
relatively closed to the outside world both countries suffered from a series of weak 
economic policies, leading to high-inflation boom, a deep economic downturn, 
economic depression, fiscal deficits, and an increase in unemployment. 
In order to have a coherent overall picture of the changes that these two 
countries went through since the second half of the 20
th
 century, we will provide a 
brief intro on the evolution and profile of Greek and Turkish political economy, their 
bilateral economic relations and the role that external players like the European 
Community/Union and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) played in the 
transformation of their economies and consequently to their bilateral relations. 
 Main focus will be given since the 1980s, a decade of liberalization of the 
national economies of Greece and Turkey and a turn to privatization and market-
oriented reforms heavily linked to internationalization of the world economy.
63
 It is 
observed that since the 1980s the world started to change dramatically. Globalization 
has brought real changes in the world politics and economics. Economic globalization 
more particular has introduced important developments in trade, finance, and foreign 
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direct investment (FDI) by multinational corporations.
64
 In this context business 
sector gained globally a vital role in 1980s and onwards as the role of the state in 
economy has lessened considerably. These changing dynamics of world economy that 
came into being had also an effect on the transformation of the Greek and Turkish 
economy, their bilateral cooperation and further to the role of business elites of the 
two countries.           
 Moreover, the EU and the Europeanization effect
65
 that the former has on 
member and potential member states has played a critical role in the transformation of 
the two countries political and economic life. Europeanization has not only support 
and urged the liberalization of the two economies and their absorption to market
66
-
oriented system but also through encouraging and helping to the creation of political 
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stability-which became a pre-requisite for developing economic ties between 
countries- has fostered the economic cooperation among the two states. 
Therefore, by trying to locate Greek-Turkish political economic evolution, in 
historical perspective it will be managed to better understand the domestic and 
international factors that led to the transformation of their policies and their bilateral 
political and economic relations. This will not only give us a clearer image of the 
parallel but also diverse roads that the two countries followed but also it will help us 
to better understand their economic relations in a wider context; the effects of global 
changes; the indirect role of third power in their economic relations; the role that 
business elites had on the economic rapprochement and so on and so forth.  
 
2.2 The evolution of Greek economy  
In the case of Greek economy the post-1949 period was an era of rapid growth and 
fiscal stability. However in the post-1974 environment the oil crisis along with the 
expansionist policies pursued by successive governments were preceded by limited 
growth, executive stagnation, and higher unemployment, loss of competitiveness 
symptoms of deindustrialization, dramatically high inflation,
67
accumulated debts, and 
most importantly decline of investments. As D. Close puts it “the first fact to be 
explained about the economy between 1974 and 1993 is the worsening performance 
of most sectors for much or all of the period”.68According to Close the reason for this 
poor economic performance was the disappearance of prior conditions like; regimes 
friendly to big business, low wages and farmers almost no existed incomes, tariff 
protection and the decline of investments foreign and domestic.
69
 Furthermore, 
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although efforts were made in 1985-87 and in 1992-93, to stabilize the economy the 
measures taken were proved to be inadequate to deal with the problem not only 
because they were implemented for a short period of time-due to the pressure of 
political considerations- but most importantly because they could not be backed up by 
the then-existing institutional framework for economic and monetary policy-making.
70
 
Thus, it seems like that the Greek economic of the 1979-1993 period reflected the 
influential role and interaction of various economic, structural and political factors.
71
 
It was the economic crisis that was beginning to erupt along with Turkey's 
intervention in Cyprus in 1974
72
 that pushed almost immediately the New Democracy 
(ND) Government to apply for full membership to the EEC in early 1975.
73
 What 
Prime Minister C. Karamanlis hoped was the consolidation of the fragile democratic 
order, economic development and security against the Turkish threat, through closer 
integration with the EC. Karamanlis goal was to Westernize and modernize Greece.
74
 
Greece joined the EEC, as its tenth member, in 1981. However, the situation didn‟t 
change considerably on the ground. It seems that after 1974 nationalist economic 
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tendencies were raised.
75
An indicative example of these tendencies was the 
nationalization by the ND government in 1975 and 1977 and from 1981 form the 
socialist PASOK government of some public-private enterprises such as Olympic 
Airways, Commercial Banks, city transport companies etc.
76
 The takeover of Olympic 
Airways by the state, an action which by itself is a contradiction with practices of the 
EC, presented as the epitome of the lack of Europeanization in internal affairs.
77
 
 Although, in the 1980s protective trade barriers were removed- thus an 
excessively regulated banking system started gradually to liberalise- and cohesion 
funds were contributed in was obvious by the late 1980s that Greece had fallen behind 
the other developing countries (i.e. Portugal, Spain, and Ireland) of the EEC.
78
 Since 
her accession to the EEC, with the exception of a stabilization parenthesis between 
1985 and 1987
79
-which was introduced due to the rapid deterioration in Greece‟s 
external accounts and extremely high inflation- Greece consistently increased her 
distance from the Community.
80
As the necessity to Westernize and modernize its 
policy and economy was becoming systematic, Greece had to make a great effort in 
order overcome „continual problems which characterise the Greek polity, and are 
rooted in the historical and political culture of the country: institutional 
centralisation combined with ineffective policy-making and implementation, intense 
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politicisation of economic and social relations, an absence of stratagem, an 
overwhelming public sector, a weak paternalistic state and a ubiquitous network of 
clientelistic relations'
81
.   
 It is thus obvious that Greece was the country with the most pronounced 
overall economic and structural divergence from the EU standard. The fact that 
Greece‟s entrance to the EC was accompanied with the rise to power of the socialist 
party (PASOK) of Andreas Papandreou how carried out an anti-EC and populist 
agenda didn‟t help much coming closer to EC. In fact one could argue that in the 
contrary Papandreou‟s „structuralism‟ policies of state interventionism ended up 
increasing consumption and budget deficits.
82
 
   Although the PASOK government managed to increase the funding of the 
Greek economy by the EEC and avoided suggested liberalization reforms, the country 
failed to benefit from the loans and subsidies that had bargained. The PASOK 
administration continued to pursue expansionary policies, which fuelled inflation and 
led to balance-of-payments difficulties. Furthermore, the huge growing public sector 
deficits were financed by borrowing. By the end of the 1980s, Greek public spending 
had climbed to 55.7 per cent of GDP that means it was 16 per cent higher than the 
OECD average and 8 per cent higher than the EC average.
83
 At the same time no 
privatization measures were implemented and no market liberalization programme 
was adopted or enforced.
84
 Therefore, it doesn‟t come as a surprise the fact that from 
at least 1985 until approximately 1998, international agencies such as the OECD and 
the European Commission consequently reported serious faults in the economy, slow 
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growth and deindustrialization.
85
        
 Due to all the above, Greece during most of the 1990s was under the 
supervision of the European Commission and the IMF, who worked to ensure the 
reduction of the budget deficit and the de-nationalization of economy.
86
All these 
along with the serious pressure from the EU marked a change in Greece‟s economic 
policy. Starting from 1991, Greek governments sought to minimize the role of the 
state and start privatization schemes. However, in 1993 the program came to a halt as 
etatist tradition seems to have had deep roots and was sustained by multiple 
institutional arrangements and informal practices.
87
  
Although, in the 1980s the Greek government followed anti-European, 
nationalistic policies, in the mid-1990s Greece started to transform politically and 
economically. The 1990s, was a decade characterized by stability, continuity of 
policies “and a gradual build-up of economic policy success”.88 This change had 
much to do with EU‟s effect and role. As Tharouhas puts it, “Greek policymakers 
came under EU pressure to accept the need for economic reforms in line with the 
Unions Single Market program and its goal for an Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU).”89 
After the establishment of the Maastricht criteria for EMU entry -low 
inflation, deficit reduction, currency stability-, satisfaction of the criteria became the 
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primary objective for the Greek policymakers.
90
 The adoption of domestic market 
policies of neo-liberalism is in accordance with EMU as the latter is considered to 
reinforce globalization‟s characteristics of free capital movement, open trading, and 
threats of exit from mobile transnational businesses unless domestic tax and 
regulatory costs are reduced.”91        
 The need to cope with forces of globalization and benefit from the EMU was 
accompanied with the rise to power of C. Simitis in 1996, a strongly pro-European 
politician who made his main priority the country‟s entrance to the Eurozone.92 Prime 
Minister Simitis realized that the entry of Greece in the EMU was of great importance 
as exclusion from the later would mean exclusion from a major new step in European 
integration.
93
 Thus, the task was to keep Greece on track with European and 
international trends. Further, EMU was seen as a means to an important strategic 
objective at home, one that could not be easily achieved by another means. According 
to K. Featherstone for Greece, Italy, and Spain, „the strategic opportunity arose from 
additional factors: a recognition that EMU was consistent with the demands of the 
wider global economy, to which adjustment was also necessary; and, a calculation 
that reform of the EMS and then EMU itself was unstoppable. It was in this 
framework that the Simitis government introduced a reform package included plans 
for privatization, labour market and pension reform. Finally, Greece‟s entrance in the 
EMU in 2001 was perceived firstly as the end of a long and difficult road who led to 
the boosting of the country‟s economy and secondly as the beginning of new era of 
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economic stability, growth and-at least in theoretical level as Tharouhas rightfully 
states- promising developments regarding its attractiveness as an investment site.
94
 At this point, however, it has to be pointed out that this economic strategy of 
Europeanization was supported by both big political parties (PASOK and ND) in 
Greece. Greece‟s political culture was totally transformed and matured as both big 
parties and there politicians, had abandon old nationalistic frames and had adopted a 
new more productive rhetoric. There was a more wide understanding and support for 
the socioeconomic reforms necessary to be made in order to join the EMU.  Except of 
the necessary political commitment, public support for transformation, development 
and stability, along with the improved institutional framework for monetary policy, 
and finally the financial support mechanisms of the European Union, EMU seemed to 
have contributed heavily to the creation of a more stable and vibrant economy.
95
 And 
that has mainly to do with the fact that EMU and the Maastricht criteria; foster 
policies that resulted in the lessening of state‟s role in economy; help to adopt, and put 
forward policies that –not only fulfil the Maastricht criteria- create more flexible 
markets; and finally help tackling the limitations and gross inequities of social welfare 
provision.
96
  
Unfortunately, although, Greece is a member of the EU for 30 years and a 
member of the EMU for almost 10 years it failed to harmonize its economic policies 
with the rest of the EU members and EMU‟s objectives. Greece‟s failure to adjust its 
economic policies in the long term, along with global economic crises of 2009 -that 
had tremendous effects on the Greek economy- and Greece‟s high fiscal imbalances, 
                                                 
94
 D. Tsarouhas, op. cit., p. 42 
95
 R. C. Bryant, N. C. Garganas, G. S. Tavlas, op. cit., pp. 34-36 
96
 For more on the Maastricht criteria look at the EU‟s official site: http://europa.eu/index_en.htm and 
R. Afxentiou, “Convergence, the Maastricht criteria, and their benefits”, The Brown Journal of World 
Affairs, Winter/Spring 2000 – Volume VII, Issue 1, 245-254 
 
The political economy of Greek-Turkish Relations                                                                               30 
  
deterioration of competitiveness (that hindered the external balance of the economy) 
and the rise of deficit (in 2009 the budget deficit was around 12.7 percent)
97
 that 
contributed to the extreme growth of public dept (121 percent of GDP in 2010)
98
 led 
to the current economic crisis and Greece‟s resort to austerity measures and to a 
emergency economic package by the IMF/EU.
99
      
 Therefore, it is observed that the Greek economy was and still is highly 
affected by wider economic transformations, political changes, and thus global 
economic changes. The effects of globalization and more specifically Europeanization 
significantly transformed the Greek policy and economy and facilitated the 
convergence of Greece towards European norms and standards. The EU especially 
through the EMU had been instrumental in convergence process of economic policies.
       
2.3 The evolution of Turkish economy 
In the case of Turkey, from the very beginning of the Turkish Republic in 1923, 
subsequent governments have followed centralized policies and economic 
protectionism.
100
 Central principle of economic policymaking was the role of the 
state; the state was not just a regulator but also employer and producer.
101
 This 
extensive role of the state had a tremendous effect on the economy, as fiscal policy 
was seen as an extension of politics. This led to inefficiencies in state-owned 
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enterprises (SEE) due to widespread clientelism and corruption. Macroeconomic 
instability that dominated the economy of the country throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
was mainly initiated by the political elites of the country from previous decades.
102
 
 One can thus understand that Turkey is a country with a tradition of a state-
directed economy that was relatively closed to the outside world. Turkey‟s politic and 
economic realms were heavily interrelated with no clear and sufficient boundaries 
between them. Business cycles were closely interacting with political elites creating 
thus clientelistic patterns and the rise of populist circles. Through the 1960s and 1970s 
democratically elected governments initiated “populist cycles” in order to gain broad 
electoral support and campaign funding in exchange for lucrative government 
contracts.
103
 The weakness of democratic governments to govern effectively the 
economy led to high inflation, reduced growth and finally led to persistent payment 
crises of the late 1950s and late 1970s.
104
       
 It was after these crises that the then Prime Minister and later President Turgut 
Ozal decided to open up the economy in the 1980s, and adopt a neoliberal economic 
model. The program involved both short-term stabilization and longer-term structural 
adjustment based on collaboration between the IMF and the World Bank. The 
program‟s target was the liberalization of the country‟s economy and its integration 
into the world market.
105
 In line with financial globalization Turkish economy became 
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more open and integrated into the global economy. Moreover, in the new political-
economic framework the economic role of the state was redefined- in a degree.
106
 
Unfortunately, that did not stop the crises which were becoming more and more 
frequent in an environment accompanied by massive inflow of short-term 
international capital inflows.         
 In the 1990s, the economy of Turkey suffered from a series of coalition 
governments with weak economic policies, leading to high-inflation boom-and-bust 
cycles which led to the successive crises of 1994 and 2001. Furthermore, financial 
liberalization gave to the government the ability to borrow domestically and that 
along with the huge budget deficit resulted to the increase of domestic dept which 
caused a move towards higher interest rates.
107
 Thus, Turkish economy was trapped in 
a circle of increasing deficits and rising rates. This “premature”- as Z. Onis puts it- 
exposure to financial globalization was the reason for an extensive “increase in 
foreign-denominated liabilities, as Turkish banks engaged in arbitrage, gaining from 
high profits and an extremely lucrative tax and regulatory system.”108   
 A positive development in the mid-1990s, however, was Turkey‟s closer 
integration with the European Union by agreeing to a customs union (CU) in 31 
December 1995.
109
 The CU has been instrumental in the adoption of crucial 
regulatory reforms like competition policy and intellectual property rights, measures 
that facilitated Turkey‟s compliance to global norms of competition. M. Bac points 
out that prior to the European Parliament's vote on the Customs Union in December 
1995, the Turkish government adopted a major package of constitutional change in 
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order to satisfy the Members of the European Parliament (MEP) regarding the state of 
democracy in Turkey. According to M. Bac, this is an important illustration of the 
EU's impact on Turkey's Europeanization even in the absence of a membership 
perspective, solely within the premises of its Association.
110
    
 Nevertheless, this development didn‟t stop Turkey‟s economic problems to 
culminate in the severe banking and economic crisis of 2001, which was followed by 
a deep economic downturn and a dramatic increase in unemployment. The paradox of 
the 2001 crises was that when it happened the country was under an economic 
program agreed with the IMF since 1998, the “Staff Monitoring program” that led to a 
stand-by agreement of 1999. The goal of the program was to tackle with problems like 
structural budget deficit and chronic inflation. The anti-inflationary program also 
would also deal with key problems in the areas of taxation, privatization of public 
enterprises, banking regulation and also the reform of agricultural price support 
schemes.
111
 The program was aiming, therefore, to the stabilization and reform of 
Turkish economy, a prospect that was welcomed with optimism. One should note 
however that another cause for this optimism was the fact that, the same month that 
the agreement was signed, Turkey was granted with its EU “candidacy status” at the 
EU‟s Helsinki Summit. This development was a milestone in Turkey‟s transformation 
as it filled the Turks with new enthusiasm and triggered one of the most intense 
periods of economic and political reform in Turkish history.
112
The Turkish 
government now had a strong incentive for its democratization, as Turkey was for the 
first time given a clear perspective for membership.     
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 It wasn‟t long after the EU‟s decision and the singing of the stand-by 
agreement with the IMF that it became apparent that the coalition government
113
 that 
was formed in 1999 under the leadership of Bulent Ecevit lacked cohesion and 
commitment to successfully implement the economic program. This lack of 
commitment affected investor confidence and became one of the underlying sources 
of the massive exodus of short-term capital in November 2000.
114
It is intriguing, 
nonetheless that the presence and participation of the IMF to the program failed to fill 
with confidence the market participants.      
 However after the 2001 crises the IMF increased its power and gained 
successfully the upper hand, making it thus easier for key components of the reform 
package to be implemented. Monetary and fiscal policies and structural economic 
reforms were adopted and implemented with the objective of both stabilizing and 
strengthening the growth process of the country so as to provide for a long-term 
growth while at the same time protecting Turkey from another crises.
115
 The reform 
process had not only with the support of the IMF but also of the World Bank and the 
EU. Actually, one of the most positive outcomes of the crises was the fact that it 
offered a great opportunity for implementing a series of reforms while at the same 
time it improved the role of external players like the EU and the IMF in accelerating 
the momentum of the reform process.   
 So, as far as, re-establishing macroeconomic stability, accelerating growth 
(Turkey's economy grew an average of 6.0% per year from 2002 through 2007), 
reducing inflation and interest rates, and redacting the government debt (39.5% of 
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GDP in 2008), is concerned the programme has been quite successful and Turkey‟s 
economy has been recovered.
116
 Of course in this effort the autonomy and the 
regulatory role that was given to the Banking Regulation and Supervision Authority 
have been crucial to these developments. Furthermore, the Law on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in 2003 played a determinant role in improving investment 
conditions and creating important investment incentives that led to a serious increase 
in FDI inflows.  An indicative fact of Turkey‟s success in attracting FDI is that after 
years of low levels of FDI, Turkey succeeded in attracting $18.3 billion in net FDI in 
2008.
117
 According to the US Department of State factors like; large privatizations, 
strong and stable growth, and structural changes in the banking sector, retail, and 
telecommunications sectors contributed heavily to the 2008 rise in foreign 
investment.
118
  
However, another influential factor for macroeconomic stability, growth and 
attraction of FDI was the stability fostered by the start of Turkey's EU accession 
negotiations. The decision to start accession negotiation initiated a momentum of 
genuine change; the reform process was now beginning to gain traction. In the years 
following the Helsinki summit, the European Union through the conditionality 
policy
119
 has empowered those domestic groups that favour Turkey's membership and 
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has played a crucial role as a trigger of political and economic reforms' within the 
country.
120
 The EU managed Turkey to transform its state-centric polity into a more 
democratic, economically stable and pluralist one.
121
The progress made by Turkish 
government, in Europeanization and fulfilling the EU‟s Copenhagen criteria was 
remarkable. The prospective of EU membership provided a very strong incentive and 
the necessary “excuse” to the moderately Islamist Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) to make these difficult changes. According to academicians and more 
informed observes the EU has indeed been an “anchor” facilitating the development 
process of Turkish political and economic reforms.
122
      
In comparative perspective to the Greek case, Turkish experience seems to 
have started approximately from the same point. Both economies were characterized 
by weak economic policies, state-directed economies, which caused inflation, 
unemployment, slow growth etc. However despite the fact that the goals that would 
lead to economic transformation and complying with the forces of globalization, set 
by IMF and EU in case of Greece and Turkey resemble each other to a large extent, 
the sources to reinforce the reforms were quite very different. While in Greece the 
main actor fostering necessary changes was the EU in the case of Turkey the 
economic prevalence of the IMF over the EU in shaping economic reforms was 
obvious. Nonetheless, after 2000 and Turkey‟s EU candidacy the EU acquired a more 
active role in helping accelerating the momentum of the reform process. Therefore, it 
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is seen that also in the case of Turkey globalization and Europeanization played a 
crucial role in the political and economic transformations. 
 
2.4 The origins and evolution of Greek-Turkish economic partnership 
Regardless of the fact that, geographic proximity could foster beneficial economic ties 
-from the advantages of cross-border trade relations such as commerce, investment, 
tourism, infrastructure, international networks, energy and transportation- for both 
countries, Greece and Turkey had not managed to promote economic integration until 
very recently. One could easily argue that economic relations up to the 1980s, was of 
no significance and that had mainly to do with the political differences between the 
two countries.
 123
 The political climate of tensions and uncertainty between the two 
states had really affected their bilateral economic relations.     
 This situation started changing in 1988 during the works of Davos world 
economic forum where T. Ozal and A. Papandreou decided to establish a Turkish-
Greek Business Council. This resulted in a temporary rapprochement between Greek 
and Turkish businessmen. It was under this spirit of cooperation that 91 Greek and 
Turkish businessmen came together and agreed to cooperate in a number of industrial 
and trade sectors. Soon however attempts for cooperation were put in the side of fear, 
uncertainty and complex political agenda. Although, economic cooperation seemed to 
be attractive for investors and businessman, enterprises acted reluctantly to the 
opportunities because of the uncertainty in political affairs.
124
   
 Indicative of this situation is Turkey‟s Customs Union membership in 1996, 
which could have opened the doors to a significant increase in economic cooperation. 
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Nonetheless, once again political problems between the two states heavily affected 
any possibility for cooperation. The Imia/Kardak crises- which almost led to open 
conflict in 1996- and the Öcalan event125 in 1999 not only proved to be extremely 
risky for Greek-Turkish bilateral relations but also didn‟t leave any space for 
utilization of opportunities offered by the CU. Therefore, it is quite obvious that the 
political climate has worked negatively to the creation of bilateral economic relations 
and business initiative‟s.         
 An indicator of this situation is the reactions
126
 of the public opinion against an 
effort made from the then president of TUSIAD Muharrem Kayhan who tried in the 
aftermath of the Imia/Kardak crisis to develop close relations with a leading member 
of the Federation of Greek Industrialists, Nicos Ephtimiadis. As it appears the two 
men agreed on holding in Thessaloniki on the 29th of October to celebrate two great 
statesmen of modern times Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Elefteros Venizelos.
127
 
Unfortunately, this spirit of cooperation was not shared by the by local communities 
that apparently could not tolerate any rapprochement between the two countries.
128
 
Another example was also the unilateral cancelation by the Turkish side of the 
scheduled meeting of the Turkish-Greek business council after the Öcalan event. At 
that time, it appears that even the most pro-Greek business personalities felt the need 
to make anti-Greek statements on that occasion.
129
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 All the above, thus, could be seen as the reason why - to use A. Evin‟s own 
words- “evolving economic relations between Turkey and Greece are often taken as a 
litmus test indicating the degree of political stability”.130 In the pre-1999 period many 
NGO initiatives that started with the best of intentions could not be sustained for a 
long time and the businessmen‟s efforts and initiatives had only a limited impact on 
the overall setting and development of bilateral relations. A majority of conciliation 
efforts proved to be in vain but most importantly because of the political climate of 
that era. In the best of circumstances the disconnectedness of the process undertaken 
by private initiative from official circles rendered it a dead-end track.
131
 Hence, it is 
quiet clear that the political tensions and uncertainty between the two states really 
affected their bilateral economic relations.  
  However, as N. Loizides observes the Öcalan episode helped discredit 
nationalistic frames, as they proved to be threatening for the national interest.‟132 
Political actors understood that only through cooperation and coordination of policies 
with fellow EU members‟ values and interests, Greece would enjoy the advantages of 
being a member-state.
133
 This realization was one of the reasons that Athens reversed 
its long-standing opposition to Turkish candidacy to the Union. In the eyes of Greek 
policymakers, „it was far better to start the process of accession and hope that the EU 
would play a transformative role in bilateral relations than to keep Turkey out of the 
Union, which would leave Greece with an erratic, unpredictable but still powerful 
neighbour.‟134 It was believed that through conditionality Turkey would have to carry 
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out democratic reforms, change its foreign policy perspectives, and rid itself of fears. 
Once these changes are made, Turkey will be equipped to seek solutions to disputes 
and problems, including bilateral relations with Greece and the Cyprus issue.
135
 Also 
if Cyprus and Turkey were EU members then bilateral problems would be eliminated 
in the EU framework.        
 This realization was one of the main reasons that lead to Athens revision of its 
long-standing opposition to Turkish candidacy to the Union. Hence, Turkish EU 
candidacy in the EU Helsinki Summit in 1999, along with the devastating earthquakes 
in Greece and Turkey- which accelerated the diplomatic relations as well as the 
informal ties between the civil societies of both sides
136
- offered the two states‟ 
Foreign Ministers Ismail Cem and George Papandreou a common platform where 
problems and solutions could be found. It is true that the two Foreign Ministers, spent 
great amount of efforts for constructing peaceful relations based on mutual 
understanding and cooperation on “low significance politics” issues. One can easily 
understand, therefore, that the year 1999, is crucial for the new rapprochement in 
multiple ways.         
 Accordingly, things changed to a great extend in the aftermath of the Helsinki 
Summit and the earthquakes diplomacy put forward by G. Papandreou and I. Cem.
137
 
The efforts of the two Foreign Ministers led to the signing of more than 20 low 
politics bilateral agreements since 1999 in the field of tourism, environment, 
technology, trafficking and organize crime, trade, agriculture, commerce etc.
138
 Most 
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of these intergovernmental agreements affected bilateral economic relations and 
favoured the development economic cooperation between the two countries. More 
particularly it was the agreement on economic cooperation that set the framework of 
partnership. According to the agreement the two countries set as a fields of 
cooperation in the areas of energy, industry, including ship-building and ship 
repairing, agriculture, including agro-industry, constructions, including consultancy 
services, transportation, including maritime transportation, telecommunication, 
banking, insurance and other financial services, tourism, vocational training and 
management training, environment and last but not least health. Another very 
important outcome of this agreement was the creation of “Greek-Turkish Joint 
Economic Commission”, whose role is to act as a consultant between the two parts 
and for see the successful implementation of this agreement. Furthermore, a set of 
economic related agreements- that demonstrate the political willingness to overcome 
not only excessive administrative problems but also to foster cooperation and mutual 
trust- were signed in the framework of bilateral cooperation, these were the: 
 
 “Agreement on mutual promotion and protection of investments 
(signed in Athens on 20/1/2001, ratified by Law no. 2907/2001) 
 Agreement of cooperation in the sector of tourism 
(signed in Ankara on 24/10/2000, ratified by Law no. 2897/2001)  
  Agreement on the Avoidance of Double Taxation with respect to Income 
(signed in Ankara on 2/12/2003, ratified by Law no. 3228/9.2.2004) 
  Agreement on cooperation and mutual assistance in the customs sector 
(signed in Athens on 4/2/2000, ratified by Law no. 2895/2001)   
The political economy of Greek-Turkish Relations                                                                               42 
  
 Agreement on sea transports (signed in Athens on 4/2/2000, ratified by Law 
no. 2900/2001)  
 Agreement on scientific and technological cooperation  
(signed in Athens on 4/2/2000, ratified by Law no. 2896/2001) 
   Agreement regarding the connection between Greece and Turkey for 
transportation of gas and supply of natural gas from Turkey to Greece. 
 (signed in Thessaloniki on 23.02.2003, ratified by Law no. 3246/2004) 
 Protocol on technological, scientific and economic cooperation in the 
agricultural sector (signed in Ankara on 22.6.2000, ratified by Law no. 
2964/2001)”139 
 
Moreover, except from the economic agreement that was signed between the two 
parts another equally important agreement was the one about Double taxation. The 
singing of the agreement was extremely welcomed by the business elite‟s of the two 
countries as it was expected to resolve many frustrating administrative problems.
140
 
                                                 
139
 Cited from the General Secretariat of International Economic Relations and Development 
Cooperation. Retrieved Apr. 08, 2011. 
http://www.agora.mfa.gr/frontoffice/portal.asp?cpage=RESOURCE&cresrc=278&cnode=126&clang=
1,  
140
 More particularly the agreement provided for: Profits deriving from the operation of ships engaged 
in international transportation lines are taxable only in the state in which the ships are registered. 
Furthermore, dividends paid by a company which is a resident of one of the two states to a resident of 
the other state may be taxed in the other state. However, the tax rate will not exceed 15% of the gross 
amount of the dividends. Also the tax rate on the branches profits is 15%.  Profits derived from the 
operation of aircraft or road vehicles in international transportation lines are taxable in the state in 
which they are registered. The tax rate on interest does not exceed 12% of the gross amount of interest. 
The profits derived from insurance services are taxable through representatives in each country. And 
finally, where an enterprise of one state participates directly or indirectly in the management, control or 
capital of an enterprise of the other state or the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the 
management, control or capital of an enterprise of one state and an enterprise of the other state and in 
either case conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or 
financial relations which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then 
any profits which would, but for those conditions, have been accrued to one of the enterprises, but , as a 
result of those conditions, have not been so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise 
and taxed accordingly.” Cited from E. Kehrioti, op.cit., p. 24, for more information‟s about the exact 
provisions and articles of the agreement visit the tax institution  “e-forin”. Retrieved Jun. 23, 2011 
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At this point it should be noted that since the initiation of the new rapprochement 
there has been a significant increase in business contacts between the two countries. 
Especially during 2005-2006 big investments in the banking sector were utilized by 
both countries.
141
 Thus, we see that business communities were eager to seize the 
opportunities offers by the rapprochement and to expand economic relations and seek 
cross-border investment opportunities.  
Today, ten years after the initiation of the rapprochement the belief that closer 
economic cooperation- particularly after the post-Helsinki increase in economic 
activities- can foster a more productive attitude in the political arena and even have a 
benevolent effect on the contentious areas of the relationship, is even stronger. The 
rise to power of Papandreou as prime minister along with Ahmet Davutoğlu‟s 
appointment to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey on May 1
st 
2009 
gave a new push to the bilateral relations and economic cooperation. According to 
Davutoglu‟s policy in order to expand Turkey's role in the regional area, a new 
dynamic and positive engagement in all of Turkey's neighboring regions is needed 
using a circumstantial, social, economical and historical base and leading thus to 
“zero problems with neighbors”.142 The importance of economics to the resolution of 
contentious issues is demonstrated on the words of foreign minister Davutoglu:  
 
 "It is impossible for a country experiencing constant crises with               
neighbouring states to produce a regional and global foreign policy […] 
Relations with these countries have to be detached from the long and 
difficult process involving polities and bureaucrats. A broader basis, 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.forin.gr/articles/article/4669/convention-for-the-avoidance-of-double-taxation-between-
greece-and-turkey, May 2011 
141
 For more information on the subject look at chapter 3 of the thesis.  
142
 “Turkish Foreign Policy: from status quo to soft power”, European Stability Initiative. Retrieved 
Apr. 08-2011. http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=281&story_ID=25,  
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focused largely on intra society relations, including economic and 
cultural elements, must be found. […] A comprehensive peace plan and 
a package to develop economic and cultural relations have to be put into 
place simultaneously to overcome security crises with the closest 
neighbours."
143
       
 
Since Davutoglu and Papandreou took office, relations have changed for the better, 
mainly through economic openings towards and from the markets of the two 
countries.
144
 An important step in the economic cooperation of the two countries was 
the meeting of the two Prime Ministers G. Papandreou and T. Erdogan in Athens at 
May 2010. Prime Minister Erdogan came to Greece with a team of 320 people- which 
10 of them were ministers (in the sectors of economics, tourism, energy security etc.) 
and the majority of the rest Turkish businessmen from a variety of fields that had 
contacts with the Greek business elite-
145
 in the framework of the first Greek-Turkish 
High-Level Cooperation Council. The satisfaction for the outcomes of this first 
meeting is shown in the words of the Greek Foreign Minister Mr. Drougas: 
 
“We are satisfied at the results we had from the first meeting last May, 
during Turkish Prime Ministers Erdogan‟s visit to Athens. We believe in 
this mechanism, its practicality, its potential for further enhancing Greek-
Turkish cooperation in very important sectors like trade, economy, 
                                                 
143
 “Davutoglu and the policy of "zero problems with neighbours"”, European Stability Initiative. 
Retrieved Apr. 08-2011. 
http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=281&story_ID=25&slide_ID=2.  
144
 “Turkish Foreign Policy: from status quo to soft power”,  European Stability Initiative. Retrieved 
Apr. 08, 2011, available at http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=281&story_ID=25, May 
2011  
145
 “Δξληνγάλ: Απηή ε επίζθεςε ζα έρεη δηαθνξεηηθό θηλάιε”  [Erdogan: this meeting will have a 
different finale], Ta Nea, 14-05-2010 
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culture, tourism, citizen and environmental protection….Spearheading this 
effort is our cooperation in the economic sector. We observed with 
satisfaction that there has been an increase in Greek exports to Turkey 
over the past year. It is a fact that both sides have very active business 
communities. And we, as the government, want to facilitate and encourage 
all initiatives that broaden the economic cooperation between us.”146 
 
Hence, we see that after the post-1999 expansion in Greek-Turkish economic 
exchanges the belief that economic integration can have a positive effect on bilateral 
relations has gained momentum.     
 
Conclusions 
Following our analysis of Greek and Turkish political economy it is quite clear that 
both economies started with a tradition of a state-directed economy, closed to the 
outside world and troubled by a series of weak and fruitless economic policies, 
leading a deep economic downturn, fiscal deficits, high unemployment rates and 
many times-especially in the case of Turkey- to deep economic crises. However after 
the 1980s in both countries an effort towards liberalization of national economies and 
their integration to the world market started to develop.     
 The road towards privatization, liberalization and market-oriented reforms was 
long and difficult for both countries. In spite of the fact that different actors (IMF, 
EU) prevailed in the transformation process, both Greece and Turkey necessitated the 
presence of external anchors in transforming their institutions and policies and 
conducting their reform programs. Nonetheless, due to the economic globalization, 
                                                 
146
 Meeting of Foreign Minister Droutsas and his Turkish counterpart, Mr. Davutoglu, Greek Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 08-03-2011. Retrieved Apr. 08, 2011. http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-
US/080311_AH1929.htm 
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the openness of world markets and EU‟s role as an “anchor” of political and economic 
changes to the two countries, Greece and Turkey - in the late 1990s early 2000s- 
became more liberalized market economies, with strong banking systems, and 
economic growth (Greece‟s entrance to EMU and the fact that today Turkey is the 
15th biggest economy in the world in terms of size of national income is a indicative 
proof).          
 This moving from, state-centric, etatist economic policy making to liberalized 
market-oriented economies also helped foster economic cooperation between Greece 
and Turkey. Further the EU anchor and the Europeanization effect turned out to be a 
very effective mechanism in diminishing the political risk that would have not have 
been easily dismissed- only- by the efforts of national policymakers. The EU thus 
helped the democratization, assisted the development of solid and accountable 
institutions, and contributed to political and macroeconomic stability. Nevertheless, it 
should be point out that these activities would have been realized if it weren‟t also for 
the commitment that the two Foreign Ministers, Papandreou and Cem, showed. In 
retrospect, the encouragement of Greek-Turkish business relations was always- as it 
appears from our analysis- combined by political cooperation and initiatives.  
Although, this chapter is not directly linked with our research question, 
indirectly is of high significance as it does not only offer a better understanding of the 
changes that the economies of the two countries underwent in order to reach to 
today‟s economic status of cooperation; but also it try‟s to show that our theoretical 
understanding of an interdependent world where the two states are not the only unit 
organizing and affecting their relationship is indeed valid, at list to an extent.  
Following our analysis it appears that the EU had a strong role both in the political 
and economic rapprochement among the two states. While at the same time the 
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contribution of the two business elite-after the post Helsinki era- in the procedure of 
Greek-Turkish cooperation as channels of communication should not be disregarded. 
 By analyzing the evolution of Greece and Turkish economy and their bilateral 
economic cooperation it was sought to demonstrate that the bilateral relations can be 
properly understood only in the framework of wider economic transformations, global 
economic variations, and political changes affecting domestic policies and structures.  
In that sense, economies can be subjected to global economic transformations like the 
global economic crisis that for example heavily affected the Greek economy and 
revealed its deficits. However, a simple analysis of their economies and their bilateral 
cooperation is not enough to prove our theoretical standpoint/question. Hence, in 
order to prove our theoretical understanding about economic cooperation and its 
presumably beneficial effects on the political realities we are going to explore, in the 
following chapter, some of the economic areas- trade, FDI, tourism and energy- that 
Greece and Turkey have developed cooperation.   
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Chapter 3 
The bilateral Economic relations 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we shall try to examine some of the economic areas that Greece and 
Turkey have developed cooperation and try to see if the gradual development of 
Greek-Turkish economic relations does indeed inform our theoretical 
standpoint/question of interdependence.       
 The purpose is to examine sectors that serve the purpose of this thesis, thus 
concentration is going to be given on fields that are obvious indicators of economic 
cooperation. Therefore, special reference will be given to the developments in areas 
like trade, foreign direct investment, tourism and energy. In that context, bilateral 
trade will offer us a better understanding of the level of economic integration and 
cooperation, while FDI flows are strong indicators of bilateral relations and political 
harmony, finally tourism and energy relate to more traditional notions of economic 
diplomacy.
147
 For example energy and more specifically new pipelines is argued to be 
able to foster a more interdependent set of relations as they more difficult to break but 
also stakes of conflict.
148
         
 In the final section of the chapter it will be tried to unite the economic with the 
political realities in an effort to explain the linkage between our theoretical approach 
and Greek-Turkish case.  
 
                                                 
147
 C. Papadopoulos., op. cit., pp. 12-28, D. Tsarouhas, op. cit., pp.44-47, and M. Kutlay, A political 
economy approach to the expansion of Turkish-Greek relations: Interdependence or not?, Perceptions, 
Spring-Summer 2009, pp. 97-104 
148
 “Greece‟s New Strategic Environment”, RAND institution, p. 12. Retrieved May 05, 2011. 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1393/MR1393.ch2.pdf,  
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3.2 Trade 
Bilateral trade is one of the simplest forms of economic integration. And that is why 
after the 1999 developments and the beginning of the new rapprochement bilateral 
trade became a part of the Turkey-Greek relations‟ realities. For Turkish and Greek 
businessmen the rapprochement was seen as an opportunity for gains and market 
expansion. Particularly, the Turkish tradesmen saw an opening for business export in 
the country‟s most developed neighbor while on the other hand, Greek tradesmen saw 
in the Turkish market another road of trade diversification away from EU partners and 
possible difficulties that they may face in the competitive EU markets.
149
   
 Trade was thus one of the economic sectors that were benefited from the 
improvement of bilateral relations. It should be stressed that- in the past- trade being 
influenced by the political tensions of the previous years was not able to flourish. In 
1989 the total trade volume was approximately no more than $220 million.
150
 By 
2000 it reached €1.060 billion in 2000, while in 2003 the two countries passed the 
limit of 1 billion by reaching 1.245 billion Euros.
151
 As one can see, the improvement 
in bilateral relations following the Helsinki summit in 1999 was also mirrored in the 
bilateral trade. Moving on in the same trend in the proceeding years the volume of the 
trade continued to increase (€ 1.547 in 2004 and € 1.666 billion in 2005) reaching 
finally in 2007 the amount of 3 billion Euros.
152
  
 
                                                 
149
 D. Tsarouhas, op. cit., p. 45 
150
 C. A. Papadopoulos, op. cit, p. 12 
151
 “Ζ εμειημε ηνπ δηκεξνπο εκπνξίνπ Διιάδνο-Τνπξθίαο 1995-2007”, [The developments of Greek 
and Turkish bilateral trade 1995-2007], General Secretariat of International Economic Relations and 
Development Cooperation, Office of Ankara, July 2008. Retrieved May 05, 2011. 
http://www.agora.mfa.gr/frontoffice/portal.asp?cpage=NODE&cnode=7&xcc=tr&mid=111,  
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Table 1. Trade volume between Greece and Turkey (Million €)153 
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Source: Kotios A. and G. Petrakos,The Industrial and Trade Structure of the Greek and Turkish Economies: Possibilities for 
Cooperation”.(Volos: University of Thessaly Discussion Papers, 2003.  
 
The situation changed relatively in 2009 when due to the global economic 
crises
154
 the trade volume decreased to 2.6 billion from 3.3 billion in 2008 (a 
percentage higher that 20%).
155
 More particularly according to NSSG and the Pan-
Hellenic exporters Association, Greek exports to Turkey were approximately €607, 3 
million Euros in 2009, when in 2008 the Greek exports to Turkey were near €621.7 
million, that means that we had a decrease of 2.3%.
156
 A curious fact, however, is that 
although in 2010, Greece entered into a deep economic crisis the Greek exports to 
Turkey increased by reaching €858.3 million.157As it appears this has mainly to do 
with the booming global commodity prices. Chiefly due to higher world oil prices, 
                                                 
153
 Cited from: A. Couloumbis, A. Kentikelenis, “Greek-Turkish relations and Democratic peace 
theory”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Volume 7, Issue 4 December 2007 , pp. 517 - 532 
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 Due to the International economic crises the international trade was heavily affected and 
experienced a decrease of 12% (the biggest decrease since the 1930s), Speech by K. Papadopoulou, 
“Πξνγξακκαηηζκόο Γξάζεσλ Οηθνλνκηθήο Γηπισκαηίαο”, [The organizing of Economic Diplomacy] 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31/1/2011. Retrieved  May 05, 2011. www.mfa.gr  
155 Dokos T, “Τν Αιθαβεηάξην ησλ Διιελνηνπξθηθώλ Σρέζεσλ” [An Overview of the Greek-Turkish 
relations], ELIAMEP, Working Paper, No. 11/2010 and Speech of Sp. Kouvelis, “Ζ ζεκαζία ηεο 
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importance of Greek-Turkish cooperation in the context of Greece‟s economic extraversion], Greek-
Turkish Business Forum, 14.5.2010. Retrieved May 05, 2011. 
http://www.agora.mfa.gr/frontoffice/portal.asp?cpage=NODE&cnode=1&clang=0,   
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 Source the National Statistical Service of Greece. Retrieved May 05, 2011. 
http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE. And the Pan-Hellenic Exporters Association. 
Retrieved May 05, 2011.  http://www.pse.gr/en 
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 Ibid.  
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foreign sales of petroleum products have experienced a 97 percent year-on-year 
rise.
158
 Furthermore, cotton and corn led all agricultural exports in price rise.
159
 
Hence, this change in Greek exports to Turkey is mainly owned to the global price 
fluctuations of petroleum products and cotton, which are the major exported items 
from Greece.   
However, for the same year 2010, according to the Turkish statistical institute 
(TurkStat) the Greek exports to Turkey reached $1.541.600 billions -which is 
something more than €858.3 million- while imports from Turkey reached $1.456.208 
billions, hence 2010 was the first time that Greek exports were bigger that the Turkish 
one.
160
 Greek export of goods, thus have noted an important- as it appears-average 
annual growth rate of approximately 30% (36.6% according to TurkStat
161
) making 
Turkey the 5
th
 most important export accounting for 5.4% of the total Greek exports
162
 
and 13
th
 supplier of Greek market‟s good corresponding to 2.6% of the total 
imports.
163
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Table 2. Trade volume between Greece and Turkey (Million $)
164
 
 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
 
GR imports from TR 
 
 
1 456 208 
 
 
1 629 637 
 
 
2 429 967 
 
 
2 262 655 
 
 
1 602 590 
 
 
GR exports to TR 
 
 
1 541 600 
 
  
1 131 066 
 
 
1 150 715 
 
 
950 157 
 
 
1 045 328 
 
 
 
From the other hand Turkish exports to Greece have recorded a negative 
average change of -10.64% which doesn‟t represent a big share of total Turkish 
exports making Greece the 25 most important exporting market for Turkish 
products.
165
 Thus although Turkey has become an important trade partner for Greece, 
the latter has not managed to acquire the same important position for its partner as it 
appears from the data.  
Moreover, the difference in Greek imports which were -until 2009- higher in 
value than the exports created a deficit problem in the trade balance that exceeded the 
1 billion Euros in 2007.
166
 These facts according to the “relative gains”167 point of 
view can constitute a problem as Turkey‟s market is of a greater significance for 
Greek exports than Greece‟s for Turkish exports. This can cause further dependence 
on Turkey that can be translated into state power; hence according to economic 
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 Data offered to the author by the by the Economic Office of the Greek Consulate in Istanbul. 
Retrieved May 13, 2011. The Table is made by the author itself and it is in accord with the data offered 
by the Greek consulate and the Turkish statistical institute, TurkStat.  
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 “Ζ εμειημε ηνπ Διιεληθνύ δηκεξνύο εκπνξίνπ Διιάδνο-Τνπξθίαο 1995-2007”, [The developments 
of Greek and Turkish bilateral trade 1995-2007], General Secretariat of International Economic 
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 According to some scholars, the obstacles can be traced to the concern by national policymakers that 
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cooperation (or relative gains). 
The political economy of Greek-Turkish Relations                                                                               53 
  
nationalists and Marxists these asymmetries in trade become a source of power of the 
strong over the weak.  In the case of Greece and Turkey, however, is quite difficult to 
see what that means as their trade relations are not that sophisticated.  
 
Table 3. Greater Exporting Countries for Turkey in 2010 (million $)
168
 
 
2010   Toplam - Total                         113 979 452 
       
                           1 Almanya                           11 486 808 
 2 İngiltere 7 238 433 
 3 İtalya 6 508 644 
 4 Fransa 6 055 125 
 5 Irak 6 041 861 
 6 Rusya Federasyonu 4 631 496 
 7 A.B.D. 3 770 780 
 8 İspanya 3 563 472 
 9 B.A.E. 3 337 660 
 10 Iran 3 043 426 
 11 Romanya 2 599 020 
 12 Hollanda 2 462 185 
 13 Mısır 2 260 755 
 14 Çin 2 259 785 
 15 Suudi Arabistan 2 219 407 
 16 Israil 2 082 970 
 17 İsviçre 2 057 083 
 18 Belçika 1 961 202 
 19 Libya 1 934 791 
 20 Suriye 1 848 784 
  ….  
 25 Yunanistan 1 456 208 
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Also Greece‟s exporting products to Turkey have tended to be restricted on 
specific sectors, like raw cotton (61%) petroleum products (12%) and plastic which as 
it appears are affected by global price fluctuations.
169
While on the other side Turkish 
exports to Greece diversified entailing thus a more extended variety of industrial 
products that have a greater value-added component.
170
 Turkey‟s major export items 
to Greece are iron-steel, clothing, fabric, fruits and vegetable, fish, machinery, leather, 
glass, ceramics, and electrical sound equipment.
171
  
 This concentration of exports that Greece is presenting makes Greek exports to 
Turkey- according to Papadopoulos- more vulnerable as their characterized by limited 
diversity and variety. Further, one more vulnerability is that products like cotton and 
petroleum can be affected by third factors, like global price fluctuations.
172
 On the 
other hand Turkish exports are more stable due to there diversity.
173
 Thus in order for 
Greece to deal with the growing trade deficit between the two states and the “political 
fallout” that this deficit may cause, she has to focus more on qualitative and 
diversified products (higher value/higher technology) exports to Turkey.
174
 Therefore, 
a more consistent with actual world demand and supply conditions line of production 
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is needed, especially in the case of Greece.
175
 These are issues that would be 
preferably to be addressed if the bilateral trade is to reach one day its full potential 
and the goal of 5 billion Euros set by the two countries.
176
 As long as these problems 
remain unaddressed and bilateral trade cannot even reach an economic goal -of 5 
billion Euros- set years ago then it is quite a matter of theoretical speculation if their 
economic cooperation and particularly their trade sophistication can have pacific 
effects on political relations.  
 
3.3 Foreign Direct investment and joined ventures 
Foreign Direct investment (FDI) despite the fact that it is one of the most obvious 
indicators of economic integration it also reveals much about the level of bilateral 
relations between states.
177
 What FDI inflows actually show is the investor‟s 
confidence in the potential economic profits on the host country and further how 
comfortable the former feel with the legal and financial framework of the host 
country.
178
 From the states side attracting FDI inflows is of significant importance as 
the latter play a major role in the economic growth of the country.
179
   
 In the case of Greece and Turkey, FDI used to be extremely low until lately
180
, 
the reconciliation process however between the two states had a spectacular spill over 
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effect on the FDI flows which flourished in the past few years.
181
  From Greece‟s side, 
Turkey offers great opportunities for investments as an outcome of it‟s impressive 
macroeconomic progress (see more on chapter 2), its large domestic market 
(78,785,548 people according to CIA‟s data from 2011182), and most importantly its 
geographical proximity and its affiliation with the countries of Caucasus and Central 
Asia. These even bigger markets are set as primary target-markets from the Greek 
state.
183
 All these, along with the EU candidacy status and opening of accession 
negations with the EU seemed pretty attractive for further cooperation in the eyes of 
the Greek entrepreneurs.
184
 EU‟s commitment helps to reinforce positive perceptions 
and suitability of the country as investment location.
185
 EU through the conditionality 
policy presses for changes both in the political, democratic and economic realities of 
the country and thus helps the creation of conditions of political credibility and 
security which are necessary- as we saw – for investment attractiveness. An indicative 
factor of EU‟s role could be that following EU's decision to start negotiations with 
Turkey as of October 2005- along with the rapid recovery in the Turkish economy in 
the past years- appeared to really have helped Turkey to attract the attention of 
potential investors.
186
 This attraction of investors was translated in 2006 in a total 
                                                 
181
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number of FDI of $20.223 millions, (the highest point of Turkey‟s FDI).187 Greece 
role in this rise of FDI figures was of major significance as it going to be shown.   
 From Turkey‟s side, Greece offers a transit corridor to the European market 
and a “profitable opportunity for the initiation of EU-funded projects”, a fact that 
constitutes an advantage for the Turkish investors.
188
 However, a number of serious 
problems, like the bad macroeconomic performance of Greece, the weak incentive 
policies of the country and general the structure of Greek economy have been 
negative factors for investments and have led Turkish investors to invest in other 
transit countries like Bulgaria and Romania that are also EU members.
189
  
As Turkish market is bigger and offers better opportunities for investments, in 
comparison with the Greek one, we will notice that Greek companies have invest 
much more in the Turkish market than the opposite. Like in the case of trade, bilateral 
agreements -on a political level- like the Mutual Protection and Promotion of 
Investment signed in 2001 have helped and reinforce the acceleration of investment 
plans. Form Turkish side, in December 2005 four Turkish firms –Koton, Ipekyol, 
Macka, and Inci- specializing in clothing and footwear entered the Greek market by 
opening few retail outlets in Greece, joining about six more Turkish firms which were 
already active on the country. Therefore, as it maybe expected Turkish direct 
investments in Greece were not of a huge significance as they didn‟t even exceed $2.5 
                                                 
187
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million.
190
 Turkish investors did not significantly invest in Greece, and that may be 
partly, owned to Greece‟s general low attractiveness of FDI inflows.  
 Despite being a member of the EU and the Eurozone Greece has a long 
problem of attracting FDI. According to the Report of World Investments 2010 that 
was present in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Growth (UNCTAD), the 
total number of FDI in Greece decreased to $3.355 millions in 2009 from $4.499 
millions in 2008.
191
 Compared, thus, with 2008, FDI into Greece showed a 25% 
decrease as a consequence of the international crisis.
192
 The weakness of Greece to 
attract FDI becomes even clearer if one compares its total FDI numbers with other EU 
members. For example, Poland which is one of the new member states (2004) has a 
total number of FDI is $11.395 millions in 2009.
193
 Even Cyprus which a not only 
considerable small country and thus market had a total FDI number of $5.797 
millions.
194
           
 This is partly due to the general structure of Greece‟s economy; the small size 
of the market (  11,171,740 consumers
195
), the continuing changing tax regime,
196
 the 
inability to offer significant investment incentives and today the economic crisis that 
has almost bring the country to brink of bankruptcy, do not constitute the ideal 
environment for foreign investments. As we mentioned above investors seek for 
economic prospects in relatively steady and trustworthy environments therefore 
Greece is not seen as the land of opportunities and profits. Furthermore the political 
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instability of the last years may have also played a contributing part to this situation. 
In the last seven years Greece has not only experienced three election rounds but also 
in the last three years extensive riots and protests have troubled the country and thus 
worsen its attractiveness in terms of FDI inflows.
197
     
 Moreover another problem that foreign investors face is the heavy bureaucracy 
that characterizes Greece.
198
 Non-EU citizens -including Turkish businessmen- have 
been really troubled by the visa and work permit regimes. Trying to facilitate the 
situation the Greek state in 2005 adopted a new law in order to change the conditions 
for the acceptance of non-EU investors and managerial staff of foreign companies. 
Yet, the law made clear that these special provisions would apply only in the case of 
companies that plan to invest a minimum of €300,000 within a year.199 However, 
these kinds of restrictions are not particularly welcomed by investors as they seem 
restrictive and that is how they were perceived by Turkish investors as well.
200
 
Therefore, it can be argued that the general macroeconomic condition of Greece is not 
the desired one by the foreign investors.      
 Turkey on the other hand, after the 2001 economic crisis, developed -as it 
appears- successful policies in an effort to attract foreign investments and a key 
component in these policies was the Law on foreign direct investment (in 2003) that 
played an important role in improving investment conditions and creating important 
investment incentives that led to a significant increase in FDI inflows (see sub-chapter 
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2.3). It was in line with these developments that the Greek businessmen reach 
opportunities for investments in the neighbouring country.   
 Until today approximately 173 Greek firms are doing business in Turkey.
201
 
However the most important of these investments was by far the acquisition of 
Finansbank by the National Bank of Greece (NGB)
202
 that reached a final level of 
2.77 billion dollars for a controlling stake of 46% (become 94% in 2008) of 
Finansbank.
203
 According to the official announcement of the acquisition made by the 
NGB and Finansbank the deal will help NGB to built up on its regional strategy in 
Southeastern Europe (SEE) by “diversifying its operations and enlarging its footprint 
to cover a region with attractive economic prospects. The combination with 
Finansbank will create the leading banking group in the dynamic economies of SEE, 
with a presence in six countries in the region outside Greece.”204 Furthermore the deal 
integrated NGB to Turkish economic and political developments. The acquisition, 
except from the fact that constituted the biggest Greek investment in Turkey until 
then- as its total cost was approximately $5 billion- it was also a “manifestation” of 
the extent to which the rapprochement process had affected the Greek-Turkish 
economic relations.
205
 The acquisition is indeed a more of a proof that improvement 
in political relations can affect economic relations and bring in its wake an increase in 
economic cooperation, than vice versa. The above investment along with Eurobank‟s 
acquisition and Greek investments in other fields of the Turkish market- examined 
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later on- led to Greece‟s account as the 5th of Turkey‟s 2006 total FDI inflows and the 
1
st
 of the EU-27 FDI flows.
206
  
This development gave a push to other Greek banks that wanted to seize 
similar opportunities. Eurobank‟s207 decision to buy out Tekfenbank208, on May 2006, 
was realized in this framework although it wasn‟t of the same size and significance as 
the NGB investment. Eurobank announced that it had agreed to acquire a 70% stake 
of Tekfenbank for $185 million.
209
 Greek Alpha Bank also sought to proceed with an 
agreement with Turkey‟s Anadolu Group in an effort to create a new holding 
company that would include the Turkish Alternatif Bank. Both sides would create a 
common holding company, participating by 50% respectively and therefore paying 
only the half of the deals cost that was priced in $492,5 million.
210
 The transaction 
was unsuccessfully terminated in October 2007 in accordance with a decision made 
by Turkish Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK). However no 
official explanation was given from the regulators. The paradox was that the same 
year two Greek and one Turkish bank had already entered the Turkish market and the 
Greek market respectively therefore it was fully expected Turkey's authorities to bless 
the deal. According to certain Greek-Turkish and International media the rejection 
was because of national security, since one of Alpha's board members was a former 
                                                 
206
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chief of Greece's national intelligence service (EYP).
211
 A part of the press also raised 
questions and doubts as whether Turkish authorities were eager and willing to accept 
so soon a third acquisition by a Greek bank.
212
 
Another development in the banking area was the entrance of Turkey‟s state 
owned agricultural bank, Ziraat Bankasi,
213
 in the Greek market. In July 2007 the 
Bank of Greece approved the opening of two bank branches in Greece one in Athens 
and the other in Komotini (today there is one more brand in Xanthi as well).
214
  
Pointing out the recent developments in the banking sector between the two states 
Ziraat officials stated that, "Our goal is to contribute to trade relations between the 
two countries and hold a better share in the growing trade market." Further it was said 
that “Ziraat Bank will use its position to introduce Turkey and its businesses abroad to 
the Greek business and finance sector.”215 However, today Ziraat‟s relations with 
Greek state are experiencing some ups and downs as the former has been accused in 
the Greek Parliament by Greek deputies that “the Bank intended to coax Greek 
landowners to sell their lands to the bank in return for attractive loans with relatively 
low interest rates. While, others claimed that the bank wanted to take control of the 
                                                 
211
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country‟s sugar production industry.”216 These claims really frustrated Can Akın 
Çağlar, the general manager of Turkey‟s Ziraat Bank how seem to stated in an 
interview to Today‟s Zaman that, “Looking at what is happening in Greece today, 
Greek deputies are putting further pressure on us by bringing new accusations and 
claims concerning Ziraat to the Greek Parliament.” Çağlar further said that he doubts 
“if the Greek authorities would show the same understanding as in Turkey if Ziraat 
Bank planned to acquire a bank in Greece.”217      
 In both countries, in generally the acquisitions both from the political elite of 
the countries and the public
218
 were welcomed and seen as positive developments. 
From the Turkish side the Greek investments were seen as good as any as it was in 
these years that the Turkish economy had to build up its defences against new 
macroeconomic shocks, boost its performance and support its reputation 
internationally and one way to achieve the above to become an attractive destination 
for foreign capital.
219
 Of course there were some doubts about the huge amounts at 
stake mainly raised by the opposition party PASOK that claimed that the future of the 
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bank and thus people‟s savings were are at risk.220 Form Turkey‟s side, according to 
Turkish press, the Army had withdrawn a sum of about €3m from Finansbank, 
declaring their disagreement for the deal. Yet, these were only allegations that were 
not confirmed.
221
 
Except from the banking sector the two states have been involved in a variety 
of investments and joint ventures. An important development was the successful 
partnership of a Turkish–Greek construction consortium, Turkey‟s ENKA and 
Greece‟s AKTO ATE, in delivering the first phase of Blue City, an estimated €20 
billion project 100 km from Oman‟s capital.222 The contract was effective as of 2006, 
and the works are scheduled to be completed by the end of 2014.
223
 Other important 
investments are also; The successful joint venture of TURKCELL and INTELTEK, a 
company of the Greek INTRALOT Group one of the worlds biggest gambling 
services providers, to runs the local popular game IDDAA since 2004 and for ten 
years.
224
 Nireus, a Greek leading producing company in the area of sea bream and sea 
bass worldwide, has been also active in the Turkish market by acquiring the Turkish 
company IKLNAK A.S in 2006.
225
 Furthermore, METKA has signed 2 energy 
projects- that comprise the supply of the majority of equipment and construction 
works for a natural gas fired power plant- of a total power 1.645MW at Denizli and 
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Samsun and of total budget 925 million Euros.
226
 This makes METKA the biggest 
Greek Company exporting today in Turkey.
227
 In addition, there have been also cases 
of joint ventures that haven‟t manage to take off, such as the “Aegean Business Bank” 
initiated by Greek-Turkish Chamber of Commerce‟s in 2005.228 Today, the intensity 
of investment is not the same as no investments of the same or even close to the 
magnitude of NGB-Finasbank acquisition have been made. However, this could be 
owned to a general considerable slow of inflows in light of continuing economic 
turmoil in Greece and Europe, the source of much of Turkey's FDI.
229
 
 
3.4 Tourism 
Tourism is another field of cooperation that was developed after the initiation of the 
rapprochement process. Tourism is one of the most important and a dynamic industry 
in both countries as it is a significant source of every year‟s gross domestic product.230 
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visitors each year. According to various data the tourism sector accounts about 15% and 18% of GDP 
and almost one to five jobs. While according to the Turkish Statistics Institute [TurkStat], Turkey‟s 
tourism revenues rose above $25 billion in 2010. Cited form: “Greek tourism arrivals seen rising at 
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However, except from the economic benefits and the effect that tourism can have on 
economic bilateral relations, tourism can also result on a better understanding of the 
two countries people, history, and culture as it accommodates direct and personal 
experiences.           
 The framework for bilateral tourism cooperation is determined by a 
cooperation agreement that was signed in 2001. The main aim of this agreement was 
the development and promotion of tourism between the two states not only for Greeks 
and Turks but also for foreign visitors who want to visit both countries. Moreover the 
agreement also provided for the cooperation between cooperation‟s, and organizations 
that are active on the tourism sector such as the Hellenic Association of Travel and 
Tourist Agencies (HATTA) and the Association of Turkish Travel Agencies 
(TURSAB).          
 According to the tourism data Greeks, continuing with the patterns above, tend 
to visit Turkey far more than Turks visit Greece. Greek tourists constitute one of the 
most important groups visiting Turkey. For example, while in 1999 only 146.000 
people visited Turkey in 2005 this number increased to 585.000 people. Hence, Greek 
visitors were placed in the 8
th
 position of total visitors. 
The situation continues in the same pattern as according to more recent data 
from the Ministry of Tourism and Culture and the Association of Greek Tourism 
Enterprises (SETE) while 616.489 Greek‟s visited Turkey only 200.348 Turks visited 
Greece.
231
 Thus as one can easily observe the number of Turks visiting Greece is 
significantly smaller. That is partly owned to the fact that Turks have to face the strict 
                                                 
231
 Data cited from the official site of SETE. Retrieved May 08, 2011. 
http://www.sete.gr/default.php?pname=EllinikosTourismos&la=1, and data cited from Ministry of 
Tourism and Culture. Retrieved May 08, 2001. http://www.kultur.gov.tr/EN/belge/2-27503/number-of-
arriving-departing-foreigners-and-citizens.html,    
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EU visa policy. Turkish side has repeatedly put pressures on this matter by requesting 
one or two-day valid visa.   
Table 2 Greek-Turkish Tourism 
0
500.000
1.000.000
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u
ri
st
s
GR tourists to TR 197.000 280.000 393.000 485.000 585.000
TR tourists to TR 114.000 139.000 144.000 202.000 181.000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 
Source: Greek Statistical Service (www.statistics.gr), cited form A. Couloumbis, A. Kentikelenis, op. 
cit.  
    
Today, the Greek and Turkish governments are really putting an effort on this 
issue. A step towards this direction was made when Prime Minister Erdogan visited 
Greece in 2010. The two sides- Athens and Ankara- concluded that Turkish citizens 
that hold a Green Passport
232
 will not need visa in order to enter Greece.
233
 However, 
Ankara along with governors of Greek and Turkish islands- like Chios, Lesbos, 
Samos and the Dodecanese island group and Çeşme – are pursuing for Turkish 
citizens to be also exempted from visa requirements for visiting Greek islands.
234
 “It 
would definitely be a positive development for both sides,” tourism expert Birol 
Güçlü told the Hürriyet Daily News & Economic Review. “Greek people already 
come to Turkey without a visa, why can‟t Turks have the same opportunity? It would 
                                                 
232
 Green passports are a type of passport that is issued for public employees, military personnel,   
academicians, first, second or third degree public servants etc.  
233
 “Δπαλαπξνώζεζε κεηαλαζηώλ θαη θαηάξγεζε “βίδαο”, [Repromotion of immigrants and 
suppression “visa”], Ptoro Thema, 14-05-2010. Retrieved May 08, 2011. 
http://www.protothema.gr/politics/article/?aid=68516,   
234
 “Visa-free Greek Islands could open the Aegean for Turkish tourism”, Hürriyet Daily News, 07-05-
2010. Retrieved May 08, 2011. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=visa-free-greece-for-
turkes-back-on-the-agendaunder-discussion-2010-05-07 
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definitely increase the number of visitors and help improve their economy.”235 
However, these suggestions for visa-free- for Turkish citizens- has been seen 
negatively form a part of the Greek press and it is argued this may be due to the crisis 
and the frustration the latter has caused.
236
 Nevertheless, it is feared that this negatives 
may also affect the Greek people and cause their reaction to such measures.
237
 
 In this bilateral cooperation framework Greek and Turkish entrepreneurs- like 
HATTA and TURSAB- considering the geographical location, the common history 
and culture on both sides of the Aegean signed a protocol in 2005 for the creation of a 
joint council that would promote joint tourism packages for long-distance tourists 
form third countries, like the USA, China and Japan. These developments were 
welcomed from the tourism companies- of the two countries- who sized the 
opportunity for cooperation and promoted common packages for cross-border 
bilateral travel and also international. Steps like that can really result to a significant 
increase of the benefits of both states.      
 However for the successfulness of common programs and the development of 
the tourist sector in both countries greater and more significant degree of business 
cooperation along with the cooperation of the two governments on issues like air, sea 
                                                 
235
 Ibid.  
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 A part of the Greek press “reacted negatively toward a statement by Chios Gov. Polidoros 
Lambrinudis, who, in his letter to Greek Prime Minister Papandreou, mentioned the possibility of 
allowing Turkish people to settle in Greece.” Daily To Paron has characterized Lambrinudis‟ words as 
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residents], To Paron, 02-05-2010. Retrieved May 08,2011. 
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29&search=%CB%E1%EC%F0%F1%E9%ED%EF%F5%E4%E7%F2 
237
 According to journalist Ariana Ferentinou, there is a feeling of vulnerability among Greek people. 
“The economic situation in Greece has created a very sensitive atmosphere. There is a general feeling 
of weakness,” Ferentinou told the Daily News.“The negativity of the media toward removing the visa 
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could open the Aegean for Turkish tourism”, Hürriyet Daily News, 07-05-2010. Retrieved May 08, 
2011.http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=visa-free-greece-for-turkes-back-on-the-
agendaunder-discussion-2010-05-07  
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and road infrastructure, visa issuance are crucial and needed. Although the two 
governments have worked towards the resolution of issues like the above many need 
to be done.           
 Tourism is an area that can really improve the cooperation opportunities 
creation and the confidence atmosphere between Greek and Turkish entrepreneurs and 
thus help cooperation in a wider socio-political-economic framework. However it 
should be stressed that tourism is an extremely sensitive area heavily affected by 
international and local problems like crises, instability, uncertainty and wars. Thus it 
could be claimed that at peaceful and stable times tourism can flourish and develop 
but in times of political or economic unrest it will be one of the first areas that will 
suffer. For example, Greece‟s tourism fallen on hard times the two couple of years as 
violent protest and riots in Athens in 2009 and the 2010 economic crises lead to weak 
tourist traffic.
238
 Another indicative example is that after the rift between Israel and 
Turkey, Greece experienced a significant increase of Israeli tourists as an alternative 
destination of Turkey.
239
 Therefore in times like that it is possible to be a divergence 
of interests, as the two destinations become competitive with each other as it can be –
also- seen by the word‟s of the Culture and Tourism Minister Ertuğrul Günay: 
 
Greece has made an offer to share tourists coming from China and 
Japan, which are commonly referred to as faraway countries. Visiting 
Greece with the prime minister, we received serious proposals about 
                                                 
238
 Tourists- mainly from the U.K. and Germany--flocked to less-expensive destinations, such as 
Turkey and Egypt. Turkey has always promoted itself as the cheap alternative of Greece.  
239
 “In May Israel raided the Gaza bound flotilla in which 10 Turks were killed. There was huge 
outrage in Turkey over the deaths and people came out of streets protesting against Israel. Following 
the mass protests, Israel issued travel advisory for citizens asking not to visit Turkey.” at “Tension 
Between Israel And Turkey Helping Greece Tourism”, Travel News. Retrieved May 08, 2011. 
http://www.easydestination.net/blog/?itemid=985 
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cooperation in tourism. But like Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, Greece is 
no longer in the same category as us… We are happy to help them, but 
we will also continue to conduct our own promotional campaigns and 
projects. As for this year, it seems very difficult to conduct joint tourism 
projects concerning tourists arriving from remote destinations.
240
  
 
Following the above, it appears that indeed in such times of political or 
economic uncertainty a direct divergence of interest, as the two destination-
countries become competitive with each other, can occur.  
 
3.5 Energy 
Energy cooperation is another sector that can presumably increase interdependence 
between Greece and Turkey. However the development of this relatively new area of 
cooperation must be seen in a more general/International framework where the energy 
security supply has become a major issue in the EU and other consuming markets 
leading to a need of diversification of energy supply routes and sources and thus to the 
emergence of the strategic significance of South Eastern Europe as a transport hub, 
and finally to the rise of Caspian Sea as an energy producing region along with the 
emergence of Russia as one of the most important players in the energy chessboard.
  It is true that cooperation in this crucial field of energy at least implies 
willingness by the two states -Greece and Turkey- to compromise by accepting 
overlapping interest in exchange for energy security, economic benefits and a key role 
                                                 
240
 Y. Ercan, “Turkish tourism may benefit from turmoil on the Arab world, Sunday‟s Zaman, 14 April 
2011. Retrieved May 08, 2011. 
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in the European energy security.
241
 The biggest and most important development in 
this field of cooperation- one could easily argue- is the natural-gas pipeline joint 
project that was agreed on February 2003 between the Turkish state gas company 
BOTAS and the Greek natural gas company DEPA. The Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) 
interconnector had two phases. In the first phase a 285 km-long pipeline between 
Karacabey
242
 to Komotini, of which 200 km would be on Turkish and 85 km in Greek 
territory, would connect Turkey and Greece. In the second phase, a 220 km undersea 
pipeline would connect Stavrolimenas/Greece to Otrando/Italy. The pipeline which 
transports Azeri natural gas
243
 is expect to increase its capacity from 0.75 bcm in 2007 
to 12 bcm in 2012. At that time it is expected to also transport natural gas to the 
Western Europe through Italy. The construction of the Greek-Turkish line was 
initiated on July 2005 and it was completed on 2007 when it also started to deliver 
gas.  
 As one may understand the TGI project will not only prove to be beneficial for 
Europe as it will reduce its dependency on Russian natural gas
244
 but also helps on 
forging cooperation between Turkey and Greece, who on there turn will also be 
benefited from this supplementary source of natural gas.  Furthermore the TGI project 
will play an important role in the upgrade of the geostrategic role of Greece and 
Turkey as it will transform them into gas transit players and in addition with other 
energy projects- that we are going to analyse below- it will help them upgrade there 
                                                 
241
 C. A. Papadopoulos, op. cit., p. 19- 
242
 The line includes a 17km-long off-shore section beneath the Marmara Sea.  
243
 In the future it is expected to transport natural gas supplied from sources located in the Caspian 
Basin, the Middle East, Southern Mediterranean countries, and other international sources through 
Turkey and Greece within the INOGATE Programme (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe) of 
the EU Commission, info available at: http://www.botas.gov.tr/index.asp. Retrieved May 10, 2011.   
244
 “Reducing dependency from Russia is one of the most important goals of EU. Both in the Green 
Paper and in the 24 March 2006 European Council Declaration it was declared that the aim of the EU is 
to reduce dependence on Russia by supplying energy from North Africa and the Caspian region. In 
order to use the North African energy, the EU expands its pipeline networks across the Mediterranean.” 
A. O. Evin, I. Ozer,  “The European Energy Security Policy in the Black Sea Region”, Sabanci 
University, 2009, [Unpublished Paper report]  
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position into the European energy security by supplying the latter with hydrocarbons 
of Caspian Sea, and most probably Middle East and Africa. However, the fact that the 
two countries have similar objectives could lead to a conflict of interests in the future. 
 From Turkey‟s side becoming an energy hub between East and West is one of 
the main goals of its pipeline and energy diplomacy.
245
 Turkey, today, is an important 
transit state of oil and gas for the Mediterranean region and of course Western Europe. 
As far as the gas transportation is considered, Turkey hosts three very important 
natural gas pipelines; the Iran-Turkey gas pipeline from the Iranian city Tabriz to 
Ankara; the Shah-Deniz pipeline that follows the same route with the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline;
246
 the Blue Stream undersea gas pipeline,
247
 which 
according to Russia‟s plans was expected to be extended with a second project Blue 
Stream II, with the potential either to complement Nabucco (see below) or to compete 
it. Nabucco gas pipeline is “EU‟s most significant gas supply project”248 as it is 
expected to add to the European energy security as it will help the former limit its 
energy dependency from Russia. Thus, it can be seen that Nabucco was put forward 
with the same rationale of TGI project. It was planed to provide Europe with 
additional non-Russian natural gas supplies and is because of this that the project is 
heavily supported by the USA and EU. The pipeline is planned to supply Central 
                                                 
245
 D. Triadaphyllou, E. Fotiou, “The EU and Turkey in energy diplomacy”, Insight Turkey, 2010, p. 
56,  
246
 It is 692 kilometres (430 mi) long, of which 442 kilometres (275 mi) is laid in Azerbaijan and 
248 kilometres (154 mi) in Georgia. The pipeline transports natural gas from the Shah Deniz gas field 
in the Azerbaijan sector of the Caspian Sea to Turkey. More information about the Shah Deniz field 
and pipeline on BP‟s site: 
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=9006615&contentId=7018471. Retrieved May 10, 
2011.   
247
 The pipeline is transporting Russia natural gas to Turkey, with the capacity of 16 bcm per year. It is 
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expanded by connecting to the South Stream project. The project was first to be expended via Turkey, 
however, Russia later decided on expanding it via Bulgaria. Energy Information Administration. 
Retrieved May 10, 2011. http://www.eia.doe.gov/ 
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Asian gas
249
 from Turkish border to Austria across Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, 
with the maximum capacity of 31 bcm per year. The pipeline will be approximately 
3.900 km long.
250
 The first construction phase is projected to start in 2012 covering 
the route between Ankara and Baumgarten.
251
   
 
Map 1 Selected Gas Fields and Pipelines Delivering Natural Gas to Europe (source: Macron International, 1-5-2010) 
 
       
However, Russians exclusion from the project, heavily supported by the USA 
and the European Commission, which as we mentioned wanted to limit the 
dependency with Russia, along with the latter‟s need for diversification of energy 
roads
252
 facilitated the inspiration and launch of the South Stream pipeline that would 
traverse the Balkans and Greece and would bypass Turkey. The project has raised 
some serious fears that the project might create a blow for Nabucco-in which Turkey 
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 From Azerbaijan, Middle East and Egypt 
250
Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project available at: http://www.nabucco-
pipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en/Home/the_project. Retrieved May 10, 2011 
251
 Ibid. The remaining route‟s (from Turkish to Georgia and possibly from Iran to Ankara) 
construction is planned to began in 2014 to be completed in 2015.   
252
 From Russian side the pipeline would also reduce its dependency on the so called problematic 
transit countries like Ukraine. 
The political economy of Greek-Turkish Relations                                                                               74 
  
is a key player- since this pipeline “would erode EU hopes of reducing its growing 
reliance on Russia”.253 However the EU has stated that although “The European 
Union remains committed to Nabucco… and doesn‟t consider (South Stream) a 
priority project in the same sense that we would Nabucco”254 it regards the two 
pipelines as complementary and not competitive.
255
 Specifically, EU‟s spokesman 
Tarradellas Espuny said: 
 
“We‟re not against South Stream. We think South Stream is a pipeline 
that could help security of supply. Maybe the Russians think it‟s against 
Nabucco, but we don‟t think it could endanger Nabucco because what 
Nabucco is going to provide is gas from different suppliers. What South 
Stream is going to provide is what we already have – Russian gas. It‟s 
going to come from a different route, but it‟s the same,”256   
 
Nevertheless, South Stream will have a blow on Turkey‟s aspirations as a future 
energy hub between East and West. Firstly because the extension of the Blue Stream 
was cancelled and thus Turkey‟s role as a transit country for Russian gas to South-
central Europe was reduced and moreover the pipeline will further affect its role as 
the only transit channel of Central Asian gas.
257
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 “Russia, Bulgaria sign deal for gas pipeline”, Today‟s Zaman, 19-01-2008 
254
 Ibid.  
255
 K. Geropoulos, “Will Gazprom‟s South Stream challenge EU‟s Nabucco?”, New Europe, 05-05-
2008. Retrieved May 10, 2011. http://www.neurope.eu/articles/86300.php 
256
 Ibid. Nevertheless according to more inform observers-like Anisa Redman, an EMEA (Europe, 
Middle East & Africa) oil and gas research analyst with HSBC Bank in London-  it‟s not still certain if 
the is “enough room for everyone.” 
257
 C. A. Papadopoulos, op. cit., 22 
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In the petroleum transportation Turkey
258
 also plays a significant role with the 
BTC oil pipeline. Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline that starts from the Sangachal terminal 
near Baku through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to the Ceyhan marine terminal 
carries 100m tonnes yearly of Azeri and Kazakh oil. BTC was strongly advocated by 
the USA that supported the construction of the project although this route was much 
more costly than other alternative projects. The pipeline was based on Washington‟s 
strong energy strategy desire to transfer non-Russian energy supplies exports to the 
European market. This project along with Shah Deniz natural gas pipeline-both 
supported by the USA and EU- managed to “restrain” Russia‟s monopoly over oil and 
gas export and gave to the EU the necessary diversity in its energy supplying routes.  
 From its side Greece has also been actively taking part at the “energy game” 
by diversifying her energy sources but also by upgrading her position as a transit state. 
Although generally aligned with EU‟s policy‟s by engaging in the TGI Caspian 
natural gas pipeline project (see above), in the past few years it has started to conduct 
a semi-independent energy policy- according to her supply needs and geostrategic 
interests- by strengthening its ties with Russia. By participating in South Stream 
pipeline Greece seeks to promote her self as a diversified transit country and achieve 
its regional strategic goals. Plus, through and along with the TGI Greece will manage 
to cover its future energy needs. The same goals however Turkey seeks through the 
Nabucco project that- as we mentioned before- could be affected by the Greek 
initiatives.          
 Moreover, another common project of Greece and Russia is the Burgas-
Alexandroupolis oil pipeline. The agreement was signed between Russia, Greece and 
Bulgaria aiming to construct a 280-kilometre pipeline with a 35 mt/y capacity that 
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will cost around €709 million.259 It is decided that Russia will be holding the majority 
stake with 51% while Bulgaria and Greece will be holding 24.5%.
260
  
 
 The pipeline will carry Russian and Caucasian oil and as Papadopoulos points 
out, it will help diversifying “Greece‟s dependence on Middle Eastern oil as well as 
reduce the dependency of Greece and other countries on oil shipped through the 
Bosporus straits.”262 It should be noted that one of the reasons that Russia promotes 
the construction of the pipeline is its willingness to bypass the congested Turkish 
Straits and thus reduce into a point its dependency on the Straits for its oil 
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Map 2- Proposed and existing crude oil pipelines
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transportations.
263
 However due to many delays and setbacks that the program has 
faced -mainly due to Bulgaria‟s indecisiveness if it is going to move on with the 
project or if it‟s going to abandon it-264 Russia has cut back on spending while at the 
same time “Russian companies are likely to focus on development of the Samsun-
Ceyhan pipeline linking Turkey's Black Sea port of Samsun and the Mediterranean 
terminal in Ceyhan.”265The Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline which will be 555 km is 
expected to bring Russian and Caspian oil “from the Black Sea port of Samsun to 
Turkey‟s main Mediterranean oil terminal at Ceyhan.”266  
 It is clear that both Turkey and Greece try to adjust to this new global era by 
adopting energy policies which aim to; upgrade their international and regional 
position; give them access to the biggest and most important natural gas and oil 
sources; and finally become transit countries that will help to the diversification of 
routes and supplies as they will be channels of both Russian and Caspian gas and oil. 
However, the similarity of their objectives raises the question; of how much their 
policies create an antagonistic or a cooperative environment between the two states.  
It is true that as I. Grigoriadis observes “the TGI project has become possible through 
extensive Greek-Turkish economic cooperation and compromises an example of 
paradigmatic shift that has characterised Greek-Turkish relations since the late 
1990s”.267 Accordingly, it could be argued that the TGI project could presumably 
bring the two countries closer as energy relations are considered to be important 
points for cooperation that are difficult to break. At the same time cooperation on the 
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energy sector offered the opportunity to Athens and Ankara to commonly play an 
significant role in the European framework.       
 Hence, as Papadopoulos observes, “the positive-sum gain elements will 
prevail, up to a point. Beyond some point, however, interests may well collide.”268 
Energy cooperation can exert a positive influence on Greek-Turkish bilateral relations 
based on mutual interests and benefits. Nevertheless, the energy field can possibly 
become a theater of conflict and competition between the two countries. That is, 
mainly, because states, in general, hardly renounce policies and strategies that aim to 
upgrade their national interests; which in this case comprise not only their security of 
energy supplies but also the advancement of their respective roles –and thus 
influence- on the European energy map. Furthermore, it is crucial to underline that 
Greek and Turkish energy policies are also (and can be in the future) influenced by 
third parties like the USA, Russia and EU. Being participants in the energy game and 
more particularly involving members of two different- and according to some 
competitive- projects (Nabucco, South Stream), it is possible for the two countries to 
experience changes that might affect their geopolitical and geostrategic roles and to a 
further extent their bilateral relations. Energy landscape “Is like a chess game. You 
move this, I move that, you move this, I move that…At the end of the day, countries 
defend their interests,”to quote the words of Fadel Gheit, an analyst at Oppenheimer 
& Co. in New York, referring to the energy game between Washington and 
Moscow.
269
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3.6 The case of Greece and Turkey within our theoretical framework; 
interdependence or not?  
In this section, the linkage between the theoretical framework hitherto presented and 
the research question in this thesis, which is seeking to see if economic relations 
between the two states can possibly have a positive effect on their bilateral relations, 
will be provided. In this regard, a brief outline of the political questions between 
Greece and Turkey will be also presented. These questions have to do with a 
“package” of issues over sovereignty and sovereign rights in the Aegean Sea which 
are; the continental self; the territorial waters; the airspace; the demilitarised status of 
the Aegean Islands; sovereignty over certain islands, islets and rocks; air traffic 
services and Command and control within NATO. These problems touch upon 
sensitive issues in which the two governments have held traditional policies that have 
proven hard to change.       
 Following our theoretical analysis, a number of questions regarding the effects 
of interdependence and economic cooperation- like; is economic cooperation a source 
of pacific relations or competition and conflict; does indeed interdependence limit the 
likeliness of military confrontation- in state relations, especially in contentious issues, 
were raised. Clearly the questions raised by the different theories that were analyzed 
in theoretical chapter make the Greek-Turkish example an important and interesting 
case. However, where does this lead us then in the case of Greece and Turkey?  
 As far as the political, academic, business circles -in both countries- is 
concerned there seems to be an agreement around our theoretical understanding. 
Political and business elites seem to believe that closer economic cooperation can 
foster a more productive attitude in the political arena and even have a beneficial 
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effect on the contentious areas of the relationship.
270
     
 Both the Greek and the Turkish government since the initiation of the 
rapprochement have invest a lot in the belief that economic cooperation can have a 
beneficial role in the political arena as well. And that is why they have helped the 
expansion of economic ties. That was the case from the beginning of the 
rapprochement and the initiation of bilateral cooperation in non contentious areas -
especially economics- that was put forward by the two foreign ministers G. 
Papandreou and I. Cem,
271
 until today were again Ankara and Athens continue to 
support economic cooperation as a tool that can have benevolent effects on politics 
(see chapter 2). The agreement that cooperation on “low politics” can help solve 
problems on “high politics” is demonstrated on the words of the then Deputy Foreign 
Minister Yiannos Kranidiotis, in an interview on a Greek newspaper:  
 
“The initiative for a Greek – Turkish dialogue of issues of “low 
political significance” is designed to discuss specific issues in sectors 
that are basic for cooperation between two neighboring nations that 
lack a fundamental framework... the sectors that have been chosen for 
a dialogue are being offered because both sides can benefit from them 
and they do not involve a concept of winners and losers. This initiative 
also aims to improve the climate in bilateral relations. This could 
contribute to the settlement of other issues, such as Greek – Turkish 
affairs and Cyprus. Thus, having a discussion and cooperating on 
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issues of “low political significance” can help to solve problems of 
“high political significance”…”272 
 
Moving on the same pattern business elites from both countries seem to agree with the 
aforementioned as it appear form Mr. Kyriacopoulos, the Chairman of the Federation 
of Greek Enterprises (SEV)
273
, speech to Greek-Turkish industrialists, “that politics 
has been undoubtedly important in creating a positive climate which also facilitated 
economic cooperation. Moreover, while economic cooperation would bring wealth 
and prosperity to both partners, it would also secure peace and stability.”274 By 
investing billions of dollars in Turkey the Greek business community not only gave a 
vote of confidence to Turkey‟s EU membership but also to the irreversibility of 
Greek-Turkish reconciliation.
275
 From Turkey‟s side, Turkish Industry and Business 
Association (TUSIAD) has also promoted and supported the business rapprochement 
between Greece and Turkey.
 276
       
 Both- Greek and Turkish- business groups and “working groups” (created 
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within the Business Council) -by utilizing the opportunities offered by the 
rapprochement- worked on sectors like banking, stock exchange, shipping, 
construction, trade, energy, industry, and tourism and paved the ground for the 
cooperation of the two countries in these fields while at the same time try to 
contribute to the development of the relations of the two countries.
277
The Greek-
Turkish chamber of Commerce, the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity 
Exchanges (TOBB), the Union of Hellenic Chambers (KEEE); the local chamber of 
Commerce, the Turkish-Greek Business Councils created in the framework of the 
Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK)
278
, the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises 
(SEV), and the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD), 
have -not only played a decisive role in the economic rapprochement of the two 
countries by actively promoting economic cooperation and partnership among small 
and medium-sized businesses as well as major companies-
279
 but they have further 
contribute in the procedure of Greek-Turkish cooperation as alternative channels of 
communication.
280
  
 According to K. Kirisci associations like; the Independent Industrialists and 
Businessmen‟s Association (MUSİAD); the Turkish Union of Chambers and 
Commodity Exchanges (TOBB); TUSİAD, and DEİK, are some of the most 
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influential and powerful business associations in Turkey.
281
 From Greece‟s side these 
influential associations are the SEV, the Federation of Greek Industrialists,
282
 the 
Union of Hellenic Chambers, and again local business chambers of commerce such as 
the Commercial & Industrial Chamber of Rodopi. These interest groups, to use K. 
Kirisci words, “not only interact with various government agencies, but also have 
direct access to the government itself and are capable of shaping public opinion. They 
are also able to form alliances with government agencies as well as their counterparts 
in other countries, for the purposes of lobbying in support of policies typically 
associated with a trading state.”283       
 Another practice that not only demonstrates the importance attributed to 
economics and the strengthening of economic cooperation but also shows the 
possibility of business people to influence policy is the latter‟s participation in major 
state visits and in Greek-Turkish Business Forums introduced mainly by SEV, and 
DEIK.
284
 These occasions are not only important because they offer business people 
the opportunity to develop contacts with their counterparts in the countries being 
visited, but most significantly because they give to business people the opportunity to 
interact with important decision-makers directly.
285
The large delegation of the 
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan on his visit to Athens in 2010 is a case in point.
286
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 Therefore, it is observed that business elites have -by taking advantage of the 
opportunities given by the rapprochement of the two states- really tried to attribute to 
the expansion of economic ties, led by the hope of a “decoupling of relations from 
constrictive bonds imposed by political relations and their attendant ups and 
downs”.287 However, according to an overall analysis it appears that these economic 
association and players are far from the role they could play within the context of 
Greek-Turkish political economic relations. This may be –for example in the case of 
Turkey- due to the fact that “business associations do not have an autonomous role in 
shaping foreign economic policies since they remain within the policy framework set 
by the state and refrain from challenging the policy objectives of state actors”.288
 Although, the business communities of both states have an increasingly 
important place in the bilateral economic relations their role seems to be limited in 
providing feedback, actively participating in the economic cooperation, and 
organizing business forums. This may be due to the fact that “In the Greek-Turkish 
case, economic cooperation was led by the political leadership displayed by Ankara 
and Athens, as it was improvements in political relations that brought in their wake an 
increase in economic cooperation. Without underestimating the role played by the 
non-state economic actors, and their contribution in the procedure of Greek-Turkish 
cooperation it was (and still is in to great extent) the political leadership of the two 
countries that opened the way to the business communities for new economic 
opportunities. 
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Indeed, all these appear to be in line with our theoretical base as it does seem 
that political and business entrepreneurs support economic cooperation as a tool that 
can contribute to the resolution of problems of high significance. Could, however, in 
the case of Greece and Turkey be proved that economic interdependence has foster 
progress in their political relations and further lead to the diminishing of a possible 
military confrontation?       
 Although, it seems ease to prove that economic relations have been quite 
resistant to changes in governments, bilateral crisis or more general setbacks,
289
 it is 
much more difficult to prove that economics can by themselves have a positive spill-
over effect in the political arena. Specifically if one takes under consideration the fact 
that no real changes have been made in the sensitive bilateral questions discussed 
above. For example, there are some incidents that developed during 2005-2006 that 
could have affected bilateral economic relations- especially as far as FDI is concerned 
as it is a filed were stability is necessary as we saw from are examination of FDI 
inflows- however in was that years that the most significant investments were made. 
These incidents were; the almost repentance of the Imia/Kardak crisis of 1996 on 
April 2005. It was during Greek Foreign Minister Petros Molyviatis' visit to Turkey, 
as an official guest of Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, when a crisis over the Kardak-
Imia islets developed. Each country‟s naval forces were on alert when a Greek boat 
anchored near the islets. The standoff ended when Molyviatis along with his Turkish 
counterpart embarked on negotiations leading to the withdrawal of the assault 
                                                 
289
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boats.
290 Almost a year later a new incident occurred with an air collision of two F-16 
fighter jets -one Greek and one Turkish- near the island of Karpathos on 23 May 2006 
that led to the death of the of the Greek pilot.
291
    
 Therefore, one can understand that it is quite difficult to prove, not only the 
possible connection between the growing economic interdependence and political 
cooperation but also the formers role in the reduction of military confrontation. 
Although, signs are very encouraging, as far as the possibility of military 
confrontation is concerned and indeed the two incidents -and the way the crises were 
resolved- demonstrate that the likeliness of a confrontation has been reduced again it 
seems hard to establish if this progress is due to economic interdependence or not. It 
is likely that the economic costs, which a possible confrontation could have, were 
taken under consideration but so could other reasons like for example Turkey‟s EU 
membership so on and so forth. Therefore, it is quite hard to validate our theoretical 
understanding that economic integration benefits political realities and diminish the 
possibility of military confrontation.  
 
Conclusions  
As we saw economic cooperation and business relations between Greece and Turkey 
during the last decade have experienced a steady growth, in trade, investment, energy 
as well as tourism. Yet, the potential for further advancing cooperation between 
Turkish and Greek is still considerable. Even though ranking records by themselves 
may not be as impressive as the two states and business elites would like them to 
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be,
292
 however the upward trend that has been noticed during the last years is indeed 
noteworthy. Recent growth in economic transactions is not- as we explained-
accidental, but a consequence of the gradual rapprochement between the two 
countries and the significant effort that the two states (like the bilateral agreements in 
areas of taxation, investments etc.) have done in order to promote and foster economic 
cooperation between entrepreneurs. Hence, the volume and character of Turkish 
Greek economic partnership has been transformed as the economic elites grasped the 
opportunities for cooperation that rose mainly due to capital‟s new exit options that 
were created.         
 Although, important steps –that are likely to have a positive effect on bilateral 
relations and to the creation of a variety of opinions making it thus harder for relations 
to hinder- have been made in all fields of cooperation, it‟s obvious that there are also 
some relevant factors likely to affect this relation in the future. Our examination of 
trade, FDI, tourism and energy sectors of bilateral economic activity showed that 
although there are possibilities for future progress this is also limited by other factors 
as well. These are; Greece‟s weak exporting status as a good-exporting state;293 
furthermore Greece‟s unattractiveness as an FDI destination294 along with Turkey‟s 
yet-developing status as a capital exporting nation, (which as Papadopoulos argues 
can rise the “flames of nationalism” in the case where the FDI flows become too one-
                                                 
292
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sided
295
); the availability, for both sides, of other attractive options for economic 
cooperation-in all the examined fields- elsewhere in the region and beyond. At the 
same time one should not disregard the role that economic competition can and may 
play by intensifying “underlining political rivalries”.296 All these problems may well 
affect an ever-closer economic integration between the two states. Consequently, it 
becomes clear that there are already political economy factors that should be taken 
under consideration before considering purely political problems.    
 Nevertheless, even if the above limitations and asymmetries can be 
successfully addressed and overcome in the future it is a matter of a theoretical 
speculation whether or not ever-closer economic integration between Greece and 
Turkey would lead to normalization of political relations, especially in the more 
sensitive issues like the Aegean disputes. Specifically, if one takes under 
consideration the fact that it was improvements in political relations that brought in 
their wake an increase in economic cooperation and not vice-versa. Without 
underestimating the role played by the non-state economic actors, and their 
contribution in the procedure of Greek-Turkish cooperation and their part as channels 
of communication
297
, it was (and still is in to great extent) the political leadership of 
the two countries that opened the way to the business communities for new economic 
opportunities. Of course, this opportunities were well utilized by the business groups 
and “working groups” (created within the Business Council) as the case of the NGB-
Finansbank and the TGI project prove. Nonetheless, it quite hard to connect this 
evolution in economic realities with changes like the avoidance of military 
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confrontation, in the Imia/Kardak case in 2005 and the incident with the death of the 
Greek pilot in 2006.              
 Therefore, it is difficult for one to imagine that, in the case of Greece and 
Turkey, changes in vital issues of national importance like the continental shelf can be 
questioned by economic gains. Although, a resolution of the continental shelf could 
be translated in significant economic profits both in the fields of trade and energy (e.g. 
the exploitation of the Aegean oil resources could possibly benefit both countries
298
 
and the usage of sea routes as transit option would help further development of 
trade
299
) this will not be materialized as long as the Aegean dispute is not resolved. 
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Conclusions 
Realities in international relations started to change and new types of political and 
economic relations, away from the traditional state-centric understanding started to 
develop- approximately near before the end of the Cold War. The rise of 
“globalization” brought real changes in the world politics and economics; as 
interdependencies between a set of actors (political, economic, or social) grew, non-
state actors became really influential in policymaking, and economic factors 
significantly molded power relations between states. In this changing world Greek 
and Turkish relations started changing as well, after the initiation of the 
rapprochement in 1999. A system of interactions that did not only consist of 
politicians but also non-state actors, like civil society and economic elites, was 
formed. With the role of economic relations rising the role and importance of the 
business communities in the rapprochement rose as well.       
 This increase of economic interaction- traced back to the post-1999 
normalization of political relations, Greek-Turkish economic liberalization and 
participation in the globalization phenomenon and the opening of the latter‟s EU 
accession negotiations- seems to have led to the hopeful belief in both countries, that 
economic relations can foster a more productive stance on the part of Ankara and 
Athens vis-à-vis each other. Hence, the change in political relations could even have a 
positive spill-over effect in the more sensitive issues of their relationship.   
 However, our theoretical examination of the relationship of economics and 
politics has raised a number of serious questions concerning the pacific or conflictual 
role that economic cooperation and interdependence have. According to economic 
nationalism and Marxism economic cooperation and interdependence is a source of 
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conflict and insecurity as it creates asymmetries that usually give leverage to the 
stronger state over the weaker. Liberalism on the other hand, advocates that economic 
cooperation provides for a different more pacific framework of relations among states. 
More particularly, from the interdependence theory itself comes the argument that; 
increasing integration- mainly economic- among states limits their ability to develop 
totally independent courses in related policy areas, making thus the likeliness of a 
conflict to be become more complicated for those think of the latter option as a cost-
benefit analysis is taken under consideration. Where does this lead us, however, in the 
case of Greece and Turkey within our theoretical understanding about 
interdependence and our research question, which is if economic cooperation can 
have a beneficial role in the political realities of the two states?  
Greek and Turkish bilateral relations have been extensively troubled for more 
than 35 years due to the Cyprus issue, the Aegean disputes. Generally the relations of 
the two states were characterized by antagonism and zero sum game approach.
300
 The 
common participation at NATO since 1952 seemed incapable of preventing crises and 
armed conflicts among the two members. Greece‟s accession at EC also proved to be 
an inadequate solution to deal with the formers main foreign policy challenge, 
although Greeks were able to enmesh their own security concerns to an EC context 
and make EC vulnerable to the increased pressure of Greece in this respect.
301302
  
 After 1999 a change characterized the Greek-Turkish relations. It was right 
after the Öcalan incident, the devastating earthquakes in Greece and Turkey- which 
accelerated the diplomatic relations as well as the informal ties between the civil 
societies of both sides- and the Helsinki Summit where Turkey was accepted as 
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candidate state that a swift in politics was observed. The main representative and 
initiators for this rapprochement were the Turkish Foreign Minister (FM) Ismail Cem 
and his counterpart George Papandreou. The two ministers supported that, a new 
approach was in need in order to bring the two countries closer and to foster 
cooperation on matters- out of the sphere of constant disagreement and potential 
conflict between them- of  “low significance” politics  like tourism, trade, and others. 
It was in this framework that economic cooperation was also realized.  
 Today, something more than ten years later economic cooperation, 
materialized through increase trade, FDI flows, tourism and energy, has played an 
important role not only to the better understanding of the two sides but also to the 
creation of a business elite that acts as another channel of communication. 
Acquisitions like the NBG-Finasbank, energy projects like the TGI interconnector 
demonstrate a promising future as the full potential for further advancing cooperation 
between Turkish and Greek is still to be completed. 
 Nevertheless, our analysis of trade, FDI, tourism and energy sectors of 
bilateral economic interaction demonstrated that although there are possibilities for 
critical future progress, this can be also limited by a variety of factors, like; Greece‟s 
weak exporting status as a good-exporting state; its unattractiveness as an FDI 
destination; Turkey‟s yet-developing status as a capital exporting nation which could 
also rise nationalistic sentiments if these investments become too one-sided; the 
existence, of other interesting available options for cooperation elsewhere in the 
region and beyond. Finally one should not reject the fact that economic 
competitiveness may at times intensify underlining political controversies. Moreover, 
another possible limiting factor for the further development of economic partnership 
between Greece and Turkey can be the economic crisis that the former is 
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experiencing. The economic crisis and its economic and socio-political consequences 
have really affected the general FDI inflows, trade imports, and tourism of the 
country.        
 Furthermore, this thesis tried to show that the economic relations of the two 
states can be better explained and understood in the framework of not only wider 
economic transformations but also political changes „affecting domestic institutions 
and structures‟ (see chapter 2 and 3).303 In that way, their economic and political 
relations are under the affect of the EU and more particularly Turkey‟s EU 
membership. Nevertheless, today, due to the fact that EU-Turkish relations have lost 
momentum,
304
 as both parts have been shown to be skeptical about the future of their 
relationship, we cannot be sure about Turkey‟s full EU membership. Although this 
would be an unwelcome outcome, it is yet a possibility. It is therefore important for 
both governments to develop a new approach to the bilateral relations as a possible 
end of EU-Turkish relationship should not mean the end of Greek-Turkish 
cooperation especially if one takes under consideration the affect that Turkey‟s EU 
candidacy had on the bilateral economic relations.
 305
Consequently, it seems likely 
enough that all the above limitations may well affect an ever-closer economic 
integration between the two states, as these problems is unlikely to be overcome in the 
near future. Therefore, it can be observed that there are wider economic limitations 
that one should consider before move on to the political problems.   
 As far as, our theoretical understanding about interdependence is concerned, it 
seems to capture up to a point the dynamics of Greek-Turkish relations, as indeed the 
contribution of the business elites in the process of cooperation should not be 
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underestimated. However, at the same time it is hard to prove that economic 
cooperation and interdependence among the two states had a benevolent effect in the 
political arena or to the reduction of the possibility of military confrontation. Hence, it 
is difficult to speculate whether or not ever-closer economic integration between 
Greece and Turkey could lend political relations vulnerable to economic interests, 
especially in the more sensitive issues like the Aegean disputes. This “spill-over 
effect” speculation becomes even more difficult not only because the distinction 
between domestic and foreign policy issues in the Greek and Turkish case is 
something more than clear and the pivotal role and influence of the two states still 
remains- especially in these sovereignty issues -but also because now due to the 
economic crisis in Greece we can‟t be sure if the government- that know has its foul 
attention to the tremendous economic crisis- will have the strength and willingness to 
focus on the important “national issues of foreign policy”306.  
All in all, growing economic relations are of great importance, as they appear 
to play a contributing role in the creation of a greater variety of opinions and hence in 
the bilateral relations themselves. However, in the case of Greece and Turkey it is 
quite difficult to imagine economics being able by themselves to obtain a prevailing 
position at the bilateral relations and thus lead to the resolution of the bilateral 
problems. This may be because the resolution of the bilateral problems is a matter of 
political leadership.
307
 The public opinion, on both countries, still has long-lasting 
stereotypes about the bilateral issues that it will take a great effort from the leadership 
of the two countries in order to change them and convince the people about the 
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necessity of policies that will lead to an eventual resolution.
308
 Of course, 
improvement in economic relations is very important as it contributes to the 
interconnection of economies, people, organizations and business groups and thus 
creates personal trust, a more coherent image of the country and its people while at 
the same time helps to the removal of social stereotypes and misperceptions.
309
 
Therefore, although the importance of economic links, and thus the power and 
influence of business groups, have become more obvious and strong in these couple 
of years it is quite hard to imagine them occupying a predominant role in the bilateral 
relations just by themselves.    
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